Dispersion in financial analysts' earnings forecasts and seasoned equity offerings. Analysis of the announcement effect, the long-run performance and the choice of issuance method. by Rinne, Kalle
HELSINKI SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS (HSE) 
Department of Accounting and Finance
DISPERSION IN FINANCIAL ANALYSTS’ EARNINGS FORECASTS AND
SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS










Approved by the Council of the Department ¿9 / 20 0 Ù> and awarded
the grade_____________
кГТ Mofa ./'¿is






DISPERSION IN FINANCIAL ANALYSTS’ EARNINGS FORECASTS AND 
SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The objective of this thesis is to analyze the effect of dispersion in financial analysts’ 
earnings per share forecasts on the seasoned equity offerings. This thesis focuses on the 
price run-up phenomena, announcement effect, post-offer long-run performance and the 
choice of issuance method.
DATA
The sample used in this study consists of seasoned equity offerings (SEO) which have 
been launched by companies that have been included in the STOXX-600 index between 
January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2004. SEO data is collected from Thomson New 
Issues Database and the issue date is required to be within the years 1995-2004. Financial 
analyst forecast data is collected from I/B/E/S. The size and book-to-market data for 
abnormal return calculation are collected from Datastream and Worldscope.
RESULTS
The over-valued high-dispersion stocks are expected to have higher price run-up than 
other public offerings. Tests show that these stocks do have higher price run-up (p-value 
is 0.17). Positive performance of all portfolios before the offering is consistent with my 
theory. My theory suggests that high-dispersion stocks have poorer announcement 
returns. My test results are not consistent with the hypothesis but this can be partly 
explained by data availability. Negative announcement effect of all portfolios is consistent 
with my theory. I expect that high-dispersion stocks have poorer long-run perfonnance 
and here the test results are strongly consistent with the hypothesis. I also argue that 
companies with high-dispersion should have increased likelihood of rights offerings. Test 
statistics are consistent with the theory.
In addition I assume that there are opportunistic companies that try to increase their 
market capitalization by active disclosure policy and earnings management. Test results 
which show that these companies have high price run-up, and poor announcement and 
long-run performance, are consistent with the opportunistic company theory.
KEYWORDS





2.1. Overview of Dispersion literature................................................................................................................... 7
2.7./. l/se of dispersion as a proxy..............................................................................................................................8
2.1.2. Dispersion and divergence of opinion..............................................................................................................8
2.1.2.1. Miller’s (1977) theory..................................................................................................................................... 9
2.1.2.1.1. Short-sale constraints............................................................................................................................. 10
2.1.2.2. Empirical papers.............................................................................................................................................10
2.1.3. Dispersion and uncertainty..............................................................................................................................12
2.1.3.1. Theoretical papers...........................................................................................................................................13
2.1.3.2. Empirical papers.............................................................................................................................................13
2.1.3.3. Firm characteristics and dispersion..................................................................................................................14
2.1.4. Dispersion and behavioral finance.................................................................................................................. 16
2.1.4.1. Overreaction to private information.................................................................................................................16
2.1.4.2. Overreaction to unreliable information............................................................................................................16
2.2. Announcement effect of equity offerings......................................................................................................17
2.2.1. Theoretical papers............................................................................................................................................. 77
2.2.2. Announcement effect of public offerings..........................................................................................................18
2.2.3. Association between firm characteristics and the announcement effect.......................................................19
2.2.4. Announcement effect of rights offerings and non-US public offerings.........................................................20
2.2.5. Abnormal returns following the issuance....................................................................................................... 27
2.3. Long-term effect of equity offerings.............................................................................................................21
2.3.1. Long-term effects of IPOs................................................................................................................................. 27
2.3.2 Long-term effects ofSEOs................................................................................................................................. 22
2.3.3. Long-term effects of rights offerings................................................................................................................24
2.3.4. Firm and offering characteristics and long-term effects of equity offerings............................................... 24
2.3.5. Statistical problems related to long-term return estimation..........................................................................25
2.4. Disclosure of information.................................................................................................................................. 27
2.4.1. Theoretical papers.............................................................................................................................................27
2.4.2. Disclosure quality and dispersion................................................................................................................... 28
2.4.3. Voluntary disclosure and dispersion...............................................................................................................29
2.4.4. Earnings releases and dispersion.................................................................................................................... 29
2.4.5. Disclosure around seasoned equity offerings.................................................................................................30
2.5. Rights offering paradox..................................................................................................................................... 32
3. Data and sample................................................................................................33
3.1. Sample and data collection...............................................................................................................................33
3.1.1. Sample collection...............................................................................................................................................34
3.1.2. Data collection and problems related to collected data...............................................................................34
3.2. Descriptive analysis of data..............................................................................................................................38
3.3. Estimation methods...............................................................................................................................................42
4. Theory and hypotheses.....................................................................................46
4.1. Theory....................................................................................................................................................................... 46
4.2. The effect of dispersion on the price run-up..................................................................................................49
4.3. The effect of dispersion on the announcement effect................................................................................50
4.4. The effect of dispersion on the long-run underperformance.................................................................. 51
4.5. Opportunistic companies..................................................................................................................................... 52
4.6. Main hypotheses..................................................................................................................................................... 53
4
5. Test Results........................................................................................................53
5.1. Price run-up before the SEO............................................................................................................................... 54
5.2. Announcement effect of SEOs........................................................................................................................... 58
5.3. Long-term effect of SEOs......................................................................................................................................... 63
5.4. Chronological development.............................................................................................................................. 69
5.5. Opportunistic companies......................................................................................................................................71
5.5.1. Price run-up........................................................................................................................................................ 71
5.5.2. Announcement effect.......................................................................................................................................... 75
5.5.3. Post-offering long-run performance.................................................................................................................78





Financial analysts operate as information intermediaries and their forecasts have major impact on 
many trading decisions, therefore those forecasts are one the best proxies available for investors’ 
information (Schipper, 1991; Lang and Lundholm, 1996). Dispersion in financial analysts’ EPS 
forecasts is the main variable used in this thesis. The dispersion figure used in all tests is the 
standard deviation of EPS-forecasts scaled using book value per share which is measured at one 
year before the date of the I/B/E/S summary data is released.
There are many papers related to dispersion in financial analysts’ earnings forecasts. For example 
there are studies on the effect of dispersion on cross-sectional return differences1, on price 
responses to earnings announcements2, on the post-earnings announcement drift3, on volume 
effects of earnings releases4 5and the effect of disclosure on the level of dispersion2. However they 
are no papers studying the effect of dispersion on the announcement effect of seasoned equity 
offerings (SEO) or on the long-term underperformance of SEOs. There are also no papers dealing 
with the effect of dispersion on the choice of issuance method. This paper attempts to fill this 
gap. However there are many papers using different proxies for asymmetric information, for 
example based on volume, bid-ask spreads and ownership, but this thesis focuses only on the 
dispersion, because investors are used to use analyst information in their trading decisions. 
Dispersion is also a proxy for uncertainty in addition to asymmetric information. The results of 
this study have also practical motivation; using the results of my thesis investors can make better 
investment decisions and companies can potentially lower their cost of equity capital at the 
issuance.
The research problem of this paper is the effect of forecast dispersion on the announcement effect 
of seasoned equity offerings, on the price run-up phenomena, on the long-run underperformance 
of SEOs and on the firms’ choice of issuance method. As a conclusion this thesis tries to explain
1 For example Diether et al. (2002), Scherbinа (2001), Johnson (2004) and L’Her and Suret (1996)
2 For example Imhoff and Lobo (1992), Lobo and Tung (2000), Kormendi and Lipe (1987) and Lipe (1990)
3 For example Liang (2003), Alford and Berger (1997) and Kim and Kim (2003)
4 For example Ajinkya et al. (1991), В amber et al. (1997), Barron (1995) and Aliase and Bamber (1994)
5 For example Lang and Lundholm (1996), Healy et al. (1999), Barron et al. (1999) and Bowen et al. (2002)
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the role that forecast dispersion plays in the equity issuance process. I expect to find that at least 
part of the announcement effect6 and long-term underperformance7 of seasoned equity issues can 
be explained by portioning the sample to groups based on the dispersion. I also try to explain the 
choice between rights and public offerings8 using the dispersion levels before the offering.
My sample includes all public and rights offerings launched between 1995 and 2004 by stocks 
that have been included in the Dow Jones STOXX-600 index between January 1 1995 and 
December 31 2005. Data is collected from Thomson. Datastream, I/B/E/S and Worldscope. The 
initial sample size is 1513 seasoned equity offerings. My main tests compare the abnormal 
performance between different groups of issuing stocks and by using this method many statistical 
problems can be mitigated.
My price run-up hypothesis assumes that the overvalued high-dispersion stocks are associated 
with higher price run-up than other public offerings. It turns out that these stocks do have higher 
price run-up, but the results are not statistically significant (p-value is 0.17). All portfolios have 
positive performance before the offering and this is consistent with my theory. My second 
hypothesis is that the high-dispersion stocks have poorer announcement returns. Here my test 
results are not consistent with the hypothesis. However this can be partly related to the use of 
issue date data instead of announcement date data. All portfolios have negative announcement 
effect, which is consistent with my theory. Thirdly I expect that high-dispersion stocks which 
have launched public offerings have poorer long-run performance. Here the test results are 
strongly consistent with this hypothesis. Fourthly I argue that companies with high-dispersion 
levels should have increased likelihood of rights offerings. Here again the test statistics are 
consistent with the theory.
In addition to theory based on the dispersion levels I assume that there are opportunistic 
companies that try to increase their market capitalization by active disclosure policy and earnings
6 Approximately -3% effect has been found by for example Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Masulis and Korwar 
(1986) and Asquith and Mullins (1986). Rights offerings and non-US offerings are found to have lower 
announcement effect (for example Gajevsky and Ginlinger (2002), Eckbo and Masulis (1992), Cooney et al. (1997)
7 SEOs and also IPOs are found to have significant underperformance after the equity issuance by Ritter (1991), 
Loughran and Ritter (1995), Spiess and Afleck-Graves (1995).
8 Look at Eckbo and Masulis’s (1992) paper about rights offer paradox
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management. Therefore these companies should be associated with higher price run-up, and 
poorer announcement and long-run performance than other issuing companies. Test results turn 
out to be consistent with the opportunistic company theory.
This thesis is organized as follows; first literature review, then data and estimation methods are 
presented. After that I present the theory based on the earlier research and the hypotheses I have 
formed. Finally empirical test results are shown and the last part concludes.
2. Literature review
This thesis combines numerous research branches. First, I present the variables for which 
dispersion is used as a proxy. Then many empirical papers of the effect of dispersion on returns 
are presented. In addition some hypotheses-related theoretical papers analyzing the effects of 
divergence of opinion and estimation risk are briefly explained. Thirdly I discuss the literature on 
the announcement effects of equity issuance and fourthly I discuss the long-term abnormal 
returns following the equity issuance. Fifth part of the literature review deals with the disclosure 
of information. In the sixth part of the review I present literature related to rights offering 
paradox.
2.1. Overview of Dispersion literature
This part covers the overview of dispersion literature focusing on the use of dispersion as a proxy 
and the relationship between returns and dispersion. I have divided the return part to two: 
divergence of opinion and uncertainty, because dispersion is used as a proxy for both of these 
variables as shown in the proxy part. I also present some papers trying to explain the observed 
return association of dispersion using the theories of behavioral finance.
8
2.1.1. Use of dispersion as a proxy
Dispersion has been used as a proxy for two different functions which are asymmetric 
information and uncertainty. Barron et al. (1998, 1999) suggest that the level of dispersion is 
determining the dominant effect and they model dispersion as follows:
D = V(l-p) (1)
Where D is forecast dispersion, V is the level of uncertainty and p is the correlation in forecast 
errors across analysts. 1-p measures the amount of information asymmetry among analysts. The 
dispersion is an increasing function of uncertainty and a decreasing function of consensus.
Barron et al.’s (1998, 1999) model is based on the fact that all analysts observe equally precise, 
but potentially different information. There are common public signals observed by every analyst 
and also there are private idiosyncratic signals observed by individual analysts. The dispersion 
reflects only the idiosyncratic error and the error related to common public signals affects only 
the mean forecast. They also propose that high quality public information results in a more level 
information playing field and less dispersion among the analysts. Liang (2003) tests Barron et al 
(1998) model and he finds that dispersion has high positive correlation with the level of 
uncertainty and high negative correlation with correlation in forecasts errors across analysts.
2.1.2. Dispersion and divergence of opinion
In this section I briefly explain the theory presented by Miller (1977) and numerous empirical 
papers related to dispersion’s effect on returns. I show also some empirical evidence about the 
short-sale constraints. Most papers have found that dispersion and returns are negatively 
associated.
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2.1.2.1. Miller’s (1977) theory
Miller’s (1977) theory is based on the assumption that the demand for stocks is downward- 
sloping. Optimists hold the stock, because they have the highest valuation based on their 
optimistic view of the stock and they have bid up the price above the level that average investor 
perceives as fair. High short-sale costs exclude pessimists from the market and therefore the stock 
prices reflect only the high valuation by optimists. Therefore stocks with high divergence of 
opinion are overpriced and this will cause these stocks to underperform in the long-run. The 
elimination of short-sale constraint will result in an increased supply of stock, because pessimists 
start selling shares to optimists. This will cause stock prices to fall.
Jarrow (1980) argues that the inclusion of expectations for the covariance matrix of future asset 
prices could easily change the main results of Miller’s (1977) model. Using single-period mean 
variance model, he shows that mean risky asset prices could increase or fall as dispersion 
increases when investors disagree about the covariance matrix of next period’s asset prices. The 
agreement causes them always to rise, which is consistent with Miller’s (1977) theory.
Scherbinа’s (2001) theoretical model is an extension of Miller’s theory, because she models 
investors as boundedly rational agents. The bounded rationality idea is based on Harris and Raviv 
(1993) model. Their theory means that investors are interpreting signals regarding the stock value 
using different models and dogmatically believe in their own valuations. Scherbina’s paper 
suggests that informed investors base their stock valuations on their private information and 
convey that information to the market through trades. Because of short-sale restrictions, low- 
valuation investors stay out of the market. The boundedly rational investors may erroneously 
assume that low-valuation investors do not trade because their valuation equals the market price 
and therefore the market price will be upward biased.
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2.1.2.1.1. Short-sale constraints
Short-sale constraints are empirically found to be significant, for example the de-facto removal of 
short-sale constraints by introducing options have found to drive down the price of the underlying 
stock (Danielsen and Sorescu, 2001). They also find that the standard deviation of investors’ 
expectations of the company’s future value is positively related to the degree of overpricing. 
Their model is inspired by the models from Jarrow (1980) and Miller (1977). D'Avolio (2002) 
documents numerous interesting results. Short sale constraints are small on average but those are 
systematically high when the differences of opinion are high. Most stocks can be borrowed; 
however small stocks are often impossible to short. 91 % of stocks in his sample cost less than 1 % 
per annum to borrow. The remaining 9% of stocks have a mean fee of 4.3% per annum. These 
stocks are associated with high dispersion in analyst forecasts. In addition the likelihood of recall 
is higher if disagreement among investors is high.
2.1.2.2. Empirical papers
Diether et al. (2002) find that stocks with higher dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts earn 
significantly lower returns than otherwise similar stocks. For example the portfolio of stocks in 
lowest quintile of dispersion has 9.48% higher return per year than the portfolio of stocks in 
highest quintile. Small stocks and recently underperformed stocks have even bigger returns. They 
suggest that dispersion is a proxy for the differences of opinion among investors. Their results 
strongly support Miller’s (1977) predictions. They strongly reject the interpretation of dispersion 
in analysts’ forecasts as a measure of risk because they show that dispersion is negatively related 
to future returns. They propose that in addition to high short-sale costs any friction, such as 
incentive structure of analysts, which prevents the revelation of negative opinions, could cause 
the relation. High dispersion is associated with more self-censoring meaning that analysts may 
stop follow companies of which they have negative view. Therefore there are large optimistic 
biases in reported forecasts. This could lead to lower future returns.
Scherbinа (2001) also provides empirical support for the Miller’s (1977) model. She finds that 
stocks in the highest dispersion quintile have significantly underperformed stocks in the lowest 
dispersion quintile. The returns decline smoothly from the lowest to the highest dispersion class. 
The return differential between the low and high-dispersion stocks declines also with size. She 
suggests that small stocks should have higher dispersion, because there is less information 
available and in addition short-sale costs are higher. The difference is also higher for growth 
stocks when compared to value stocks. Gebhardt et al. (2001 ) find also negative relation between 
dispersion and future returns. They used dispersion as a proxy for risk when trying to explain 
implied cost of capital estimates and find that market assigns a higher risk premium to firms with 
lower dispersion in analyst forecasts. Alford and Berger (1997) use dispersion as a proxy for 
disagreement among analysts and found that dispersion is negatively related to returns.
There are also some papers that have found positive association between returns and dispersion; 
however those papers are using old samples and potentially biased estimation methods. For 
example Cragg and Malkiel (1982) report positive relations between dispersion and future returns 
using a small and old sample. Cragg and Malkiel (1968), Friend et al. (1978) and Harris (1986) 
have also found positive association between stock returns and dispersion in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. Peterson and Peterson (1982a) suggest that the changes in second moment of 
expectation distribution are related to equilibrium price, if short-sales are assumed to be 
restricted. They find that dispersion is positively and significantly related to returns in two of the 
four periods in their sample. Barry and Jennings (1992) find no impact of expectations’ 
dispersion on prices.
Chen and Jiambalvo’s (2004) unpublished working paper shows evidence, which is contradictory 
to the optimism idea of Diether et al. (2002). They study if bad news, which should be 
inconsistent with optimism, result in large negative price changes for stocks with high-dispersion 
compared to stock price reaction to bad news for firms with low dispersion. They measure bad 
news with negative unexpected earnings. However their results show that earnings response 
coefficient associated with bad news are smaller for high dispersion firms than for low dispersion 
firms. In addition, they also find that sorting based on standardized earnings surprises (SUE) 
related to quarterly earnings announcements makes the differences in returns related to dispersion
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statistically insignificant. Based on this sorting experiment and regression analysis using SUE 
factor in addition to Fama and French (1995) factors and momentum factor, they argue that return 
differential found by Diether et al. (2002) is more likely related to the post-earnings 
announcement drift phenomena than differences in opinion and optimism.
Liu et al. (2004) find that stocks with lower forecast dispersion subsequently experience higher 
level of earnings, higher increase in earning over previous year and higher excess earnings 
relative to consensus forecasts. The effect persists at least three years. These measures are shown 
to be positively correlated to stock returns. They claim that companies with good earnings 
prospects are more willing to provide unbiased and accurate earnings guidance and because of 
this analysts rely less on their idiosyncratic sources of information. Therefore stocks with low 
dispersion tend to be stocks with high future earnings. They also claim that future stock returns 
are mainly explained by future earnings, rather than by forecast dispersion.
L'Her and Suret (1996) suggest that changes in dispersion should be studied simultaneously with 
the variation in the average forecast. Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) have shown that changes 
in dispersion coincide often with important modification of average expectations; therefore the 
claim could have important effect on the interpretation of evidence related to dispersion’s effect 
on returns. L’Her and Suret (1996) find using the framework of a noisy rational expectations 
equilibrium model that changes in dispersion have a significant negative effect on returns and 
effect of revisions of average forecasts is positive and greater in absolute value than dispersion 
effect.
2.1.3. Dispersion and uncertainty
In this part of the literature review few main theoretical papers related to estimation risk are 
presented. I argue that estimation risk is highly associated with the uncertainty in Barron et al.’s 
(1998, 1999) model. In addition empirical results related to relationship between estimation risk 




Barry and Brown’s (1985) Bayesian model suggests that cost of capital is a function of 
estimation risk and the better investors are able to assess the prospects for a company, the lower 
its expected cost of capital. The model allows that there are unequal amounts of information 
available for the securities and therefore the estimation risk varies across securities. They also 
show that the estimation risk and divergence of opinion are associated. More information leads to 
both lower estimation risk and more convergent opinions.
Barry and Brown (1984) argue that securities for which there is relatively little information 
available may be perceived as riskier than securities for which more information is available. 
Therefore market participants may rationally demand a premium to hold such securities. They 
also suggest that low market value securities have less information available and therefore 
abnormal returns are associated with small firms.
Barry and Jennings (1992) suggest that if there is more public information than there is private 
information per analyst in current forecasts then generation of new private information by 
analysts tend to lead toward more divergent forecasts. This result assumes that the private 
information stays private. They suggest based on their empirical results that divergence of 
opinion may produce misleading measurements of estimation risk compared to number of 
analyst, another proxy for estimation risk.
2.1.З.2. Empirical papers
There is some empirical evidence consistent with the theories presented in previous chapter. For 
example Peterson and Peterson (1982b), Givoly and Lakonishok (1988) and Amihud and 
Mendelson (1989) conclude that the market offers a premium for estimation or incomplete 
information risks linked to the dispersion of expectations.
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However, there are also papers that have found negative association between the returns and 
dispersion used as a proxy for uncertainty. For example Ackert and Athanassakos (1997) find 
negative relation between standard deviation of analysts’ estimates and future returns. They 
studied the relation between analysts’ overoptimism and uncertainty with a small sample. 
Copeland et al. (2004) presented evidence that noise, with dispersion used as a proxy, has an 
impact on market prices when they studied the role of expectations in explaining the cross- 
section of stock returns. Greater noise increases the variability of total return to shareholders 
(TRS). In addition the noise is negatively associated with TRS.
Johnson (2004) has his own explanation for the relation between stock returns and analysts’ 
dispersion. Johnson claims that both his theory and hypotheses presented by Diether et al’s 
(2002) can be contributing the effect. He interprets the dispersion as a proxy for idiosyncratic 
parameter risk when fundamentals are unobservable. The level of parameter risk can vary 
between companies, because some businesses are inherently harder to assess than others. 
Companies act also as the source of the most relevant information and they are able to choose the 
amount they provide. He proposes that that in the case of levered firm, expected equity returns 
will decrease with the level of idiosyncratic asset risk due to the convexity. His empirical tests 
support his hypotheses.
2.1.З.З. Firm characteristics and dispersion
There are many papers that have studied the effect of firm characteristics to the forecast 
dispersion. For example Chambers et al. (2002) find that R&D intensive firms have significantly 
higher dispersion even if size and book-to-market are controlled. Barron et al. (2002) suggest that 
the usefulness of current earnings for predicting future earnings varies with the proportion of 
intangibles firm has and that the earnings are easier to forecast for low-intangible firms. They 
also show that there is lower degree of consensus among the analysts forecasting for high- 
intangibles firms. Harris (1986) finds that stocks with poorer credit rating have higher level of 
dispersion.
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Bens and Monahan (2004) find that multi-segment firms have higher forecast dispersion than 
single-segment firms. Thomas’s (2002) document that greater corporate diversification is 
associated with less dispersion among forecasts consistent with the information diversification 
effect. However after controlling for the differences in the volatility of abnormal returns between 
diversified and focused firms, diversification is associated with greater dispersion, consistent 
with the transparency effect. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) report that firms engaging 
in spin-offs have significantly higher level of dispersion compared to their industry- and size- 
matched counterparts. They also find that the dispersion decreases substantially after the 
completion of the spin-off.
Hope (2003) posts interesting results concerning the dispersion levels in different countries. The 
mean forecast dispersion is lowest in the United States and Japan and highest in Norway and 
Finland. My sample countries have considerably higher dispersion level compared to the United 
States except the United Kingdom. The cross-listing is found to reduce the dispersion; however 
the results were insignificant (Lang et al. (2003)). These results suggest that also the institutional 
and legal constraints affecting the company can have significant effects on the forecast 
dispersion.
Accounting choices can also make earnings forecasting harder, and therefore these decisions can 
be associated with the dispersion. Elliot and Philbrick (1990) finds that dispersion is higher 
during the years when accounting changes are made and the dispersion is correlated with the 
absolute value of income effect of the change. The effect is more significant in the absence of 
explicit disclosures about the change.
The earnings of high-dispersion stocks are found to be harder to estimate than earnings of low- 
dispersion stocks. Brown et al. (1987) find that the superior forecasting ability of analysts is 
related to characteristics of a firm’s information environment: positive association with the firm 
size and negative association with the forecast dispersion. Wiedman (1996) documents that 
analyst forecast errors have higher association with excess returns than random walk forecast 
errors. This higher association is positively related to firm size and negatively related to forecast 
dispersion.
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2.1.4. Dispersion and behavioral finance
This section of the literature review presents theoretical hypothesis by Liang (2003) related to the 
post-earnings announcement drift. These hypotheses are also applicable to any informative event. 
The drift arises because of market inefficiencies caused by investors’ non-Bayesian behavior and 
the magnitude of drift is associated with the level of dispersion. His empirical results are 
consistent with his hypotheses.
2.1.4.1. Overreaction to private information
The overreaction to private information hypothesis by Liang (2003) is based on Daniel et al. 
(1998) and Fischer (2001). These models show that drift arises when part of the investors 
overreact to their private information and underweight the public sources. The private 
information in these models is not necessarily better or inside information, instead it is only 
heterogeneous information. The overreaction is caused by investors’ overconfidence on their 
investment skills. Daniel et al. (1998) also assume that investors have biased self-attribution 
meaning that when investors receive confirming public information, their confidence rises, but 
disconfirming information causes only a modest fall in confidence. If these overconfident 
investors can influence the stock market, stocks with more heterogeneous information across 
investors, high-dispersion stocks, will have bigger drift.
2.1.4.2. Overreaction to unreliable information
The overreaction to unreliable information hypothesis by Liang (2003) is based on Griffin and 
Tversky (1992). Bloomfield et al. (2000) adapt the model by Griffin and Tversky in their coin­
flipping experiment. Bayesian investors have only a noisy signal of the reliability of their 
information. The model predicts that prices tend to overreact to unreliable information and 
underreact to reliable information. In addition the more reliable information is associated with 
larger observed under-reaction. Stocks with more reliable information are stocks with less
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uncertainty and therefore less forecast dispersion. The results are caused by the phenomenon 
called the moderated confidence, meaning that investors’ confidence is moderated toward a 
central level.
2.2. Announcement effect of equity offerings
This section of literature review includes presentation of main theoretical papers, empirical 
papers related to public and rights offerings by US-firms and non-US firms. In addition the 
relation between announcement effect and firm characteristics is covered. Finally some evidence 
is shown related to short-term abnormal returns following the issuance.
2.2.1. Theoretical papers
Myers and Majluf (1984) and Miller and Rock (1985) models assume that the choice of security 
issued is associated with management’s superior information about the firm’s earnings prospects, 
investment opportunities available or assets in place compared to outside information available to 
investors. These models suggest that the announcement of new equity offering conveys 
unfavorable information to the market.
Miller and Rock (1985) uses signaling model, in which the firm’s sources and uses of funds 
constraint is used to show that if the investment decisions of firm are unchanged, then equity 
issues on average convey negative information about the future earnings potential of the firm. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) adverse selection model is based on the assumption that managers try 
to issue overvalued equity, because managers are acting in the best interests of current 
stockholders. Their model and also the extension of Miller and Rock’s (1985) model by Krasker 
(1986) suggest that the issue size should have effect on the announcement effect of equity issues. 
Ross’ (1977) model suggests that equity issue announcement release negative information about 
the firm and therefore it should be associated with a price drop.
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An extension of Myers and Majluf (1984) model by Korajczyk et al. (1992) suggest that 
information tend to arrive discretely either through voluntary or involuntary disclosures and 
therefore the information asymmetry levels are expected to vary over time. Because of time- 
varying asymmetric information the magnitude of adverse selection cost will also vary and 
therefore company can partly control the size of a price drop. This theory suggest that companies 
time their equity offerings after information releases and that the price drop is increasing function 
of the time since last information release.
2.2.2. Announcement effect of public offerings
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) find that announcement of common stock issuance causes a -3.56% 
effect on returns. They suggest that investors infer that the market price exceeds the managers’ 
assessment of share price when common stock offering is announced. This means that equity 
offering can be seen as examples of lemons problem (A keri of, 1970). They interpret their results 
using both Myers and Majluf s (1984) and Miller and Rock’s (1985) models. They also find 
evidence that completed offerings are associated with a positive return between the 
announcement and issuance and negative return at the issuance. On the other hand cancelled 
offerings are associated with negative return between the announcement and cancellation and 
positive return at the cancellation. They suggest that this evidence is consistent with managers 
trying to issue overvalued equity and that the investors understand managers’ incentives. In 
addition they document that there are further drop of 0.65% at the issue date.
Masulis and Korwar (1986) and Asquith and Mullins (1986) found also approximately -3% 
effect. Similar results are also find by Mikkelson and Partch (1985) and Hess and Bhagat (1986). 
Smith (1986) documents that in average stock return of -3.14% follows new equity offering 
announcement. Tri path y and Rao (1992) document two-day announcement period excess return 
of -2.6%. Twenty-day pre-announcement period excess return of 12.4% is consistent with price 
run-up effect. For example Asquith and Mullins (1986) have reported similar price run-up before 
the offerings.
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Barclay and Litzenberger (1988) studied the announcement effect of seasoned equity offerings 
using intraday transaction prices and exact announcement times. They argue that this data allows 
them to make more powerful estimation of the effects of new information on stock prices. They 
find that there is a statistically significant negative return during the hour before the first public 
announcement, suggesting that there might be some insider trading. During 15 minutes following 
the announcement, stock prices fall on average 1.3%. In addition they find return of -2.4% during 
the three-hour period surrounding the announcement.
2.2.3. Association between firm characteristics and the announcement 
effect
Factors affecting managers’ motivation to issue overvalued equity and potential magnitude of 
over-valuation are found to contribute the severity of announcement effect. For example 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) find that the price drop is greater for offerings in which managers 
participate. D’Mello and Ferris (2000) present evidence that firms with more information 
asymmetry have significantly more negative announcement period returns. Barclay and 
Litzenberger (1988) find that the intended use of proceeds does not have a statistically significant 
effect on the observed returns. However Mikkelson and Partch ( 1986) show that equity offerings 
motivated by pure financing considerations have different effect compared to offerings motivated 
by financing and investment considerations.
The evidence related to the effect of size on the abnormal returns around the announcement day 
is ambiguous. Asquith and Mullins (1986) find that larger offerings generate a greater price drop 
at the announcement consistent with the main theoretical papers. Similar relationship is also 
observed by Masulis and Korwar (1986). Barclay and Litzenberger (1988) on the other hand find 
that the size of issue has not a statistically significant effect on the observed returns. Similarly 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) report that size is not significantly related to the announcement 
effect.
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Bhagat et al. (1985) document that unsystematic risk of the stock is positively related to the price 
drop at the announcement date. Loderen Cooney and Van Drunen (1991) find -2.8% significant 
average abnormal return for the industrial issuers and significant -0.8% for the regulated issuers. 
Eckbo and Masulis (1992) document similar evidence: firm-commitment offers by industrial 
issuers (utility issuers) have highly significant abnormal return of -3.34% (-0.80%) at the 
announcement. These results suggest that also the industry in which company is operating can 
have effect on the announcement effect.
2.2.4. Announcement effect of rights offerings and non-US public offerings
Eckbo and Masulis (1992) find that stand-by rights by industrial issuers (utility issuers) have 
significant abnormal return of -1.03% (-0.53%) during the announcement-period. Uninsured 
rights have insignificant abnormal returns, -1.39% for industrials and 0.23% for utilities. 
Gajevsky and Ginlinger (2002) research the announcement effects of French right offerings and 
find that those have significantly negative effect of approximately 1.5%. Similar evidence is also 
reported by Singh (1997) and Bohren et al (1997). Smith (1977) reports zero announcement- 
month abnormal performance in right offerings. White and Lusztig (1980) show evidence that the 
average market reaction to rights offer is negative. Hansen (1988) studies the stand-by rights and 
finds announcement-period abnormal returns of -2.61% for industrials and -1.21% for utilities. 
As a conclusion the announcement of rights offerings is associated with a small negative 
abnormal return, and the magnitude of the effect is considerably lower than in public offerings. 
This is consistent with Eckbo and Masulis’ (1992) theory, that public offerings are expected to be 
associated with bigger announcement effect than rights offerings.
French public offers are also included to Gajevsky and Ginlinger’s (2002) sample and they find 
that the announcement effect is lightly negative but insignificant. However their sample of public 
offerings is quite limited. Nonnegative announcement effects of public offerings issued by non- 
US issuers have been found for example by Cooney et al (1997) with Japanese data and Slovin et 
al (2000) with the UK data.
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2.2.5. Abnormal returns following the issuance
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) find that returns during the month after the SEO are 
significantly positive. Similar kind of short-term results have been documented by Tripathy and 
Rao (1992) and Mikkelson and Partch (1986). Barclay and Litzenberger (1988) find also a 
statistically significant positive return following the issuance. Loderer, Sheehan and Kadlec 
(1991) post that is possible to earn excess returns by holding seasoned issues for 30 days, with 
the biggest excess returns available in the NASDAQ.
2.3. Long-term effect of equity offerings
This part of the literature review presents empirical evidence about the long-term abnormal 
returns following equity offerings and relationship between firm characteristics and long-term 
abnormal returns. Finally statistical problems related to these papers are explained.
2.3.1. Long-term effects of IPOs
Ritter (1991) finds that Initial Public Offerings (IPO) underperform their first three years of 
trading. Mean (median) post-IPO size- and industry-matched returns are -27% (-55%). He 
suggests that investors are periodically overoptimistic about the earnings potential of young 
growth companies and this fads explanation makes the informational efficiency of the IPO 
market questionable. Issuers are able to take advantage of windows of opportunities. He also 
finds some evidence that stocks with high initial returns have poorer long-term performance and 
therefore he argues that this evidence is mildly supporting the overreaction hypothesis by 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987).
Similar kinds of results are posted by numerous papers. Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) find that 
investors purchasing at the closing price on the first day after the issuance and hold 250 days 
have significantly negative excess returns. They suggest that their results are consistent with
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hypothesis that IPOs are subject to overvaluation or fads in the early aftermarket trading. The 
results by Stoll and Curley (1970) show that in the long-run, investors in small IPOs have poor 
performance. Reilly (1977) find that IPOs purchased in early aftermarket trading underperform 
their first year. Ritter (1984) studies the long-term performance of natural resource sector IPOs 
during the hot market period and finds an underperformance of 15%. He concludes that his 
results are consistent with a speculative bubble in the aftermarket trading. The underperformance 
of IPOs is also reported by Loughran et al (1994) and Levis (1993) using UK sample.
There are also few papers that have documented less dramatic long-term performance following 
initial public offerings. For example Asquith and Mullins (1986) find average or below-average 
performance in the 480 days following the announcement. Ibbotson (1975) show evidence that 
IPOs insignificantly underperform by approximately 1 % per month in the second through fourth 
year of public trading. However he finds that IPOs have insignificant positive abnormal returns 
during the first and fifth year of trading.
Ritter and Welch (2002) suggest that the long-run performance of IPOs is sensitive to choice of 
econometric methodology and sample period. For example they document that the average IPO 
underperformed the CRSP value-weighted index by 23.4% but size and book-to-market matched 
seasoned companies by only 5.1%. This explains the results that Brav and Gompers (1997) 
document. They find no signs of abnormal performance after controlling both the size and the 
book-to-market equity. The abnormal performance vanishes also if value-weighted returns are 
used. These results suggest that this phenomenon is more related to small firms with low book-to- 
market ratio.
2.3.2 Long-term effects of SEOs
Loughran and Ritter (1995) find that both IPOs and SEOs significantly underperform in the long- 
run; investors would have had to invest 44% more money in the issuers than in nonissuers to 
have the same wealth five years after the issue date. There are no differences between the 
underperformance of SEOs and IPOs. They control only for the size, and therefore book-to-
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market adjustments may change their results. However they argue that this adjustment would 
have changed their results only at minor extent. They suggest that firms are taking advantage of 
transitory windows of opportunity by issuing equity when they are substantially overvalued. In 
addition they find that issuing extreme winners dramatically underperform the non-issuing 
extreme winners.
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) study only the SEOs that do not issue any secondary shares 
and find similar results: statistically significant book-to-market- and size-adjusted three-year 
abnormal return of -17.51%. They conclude that their results are consistent with managers being 
able to take advantage of firm-specific information and to issue overvalued equity.
There are also papers claiming that equity issues have normal long-term performance after the 
issuance. For example Brav et al. (1995) find that performance of SEO is similar to size- and 
book-to-market controlled matching stocks. Eckbo et al. (2000) document small but insignificant 
levels of SEO underperformance. Brav et al. (2000) argue that the poor long-run stock returns 
following equity issues are not unique to the issuers, and they suggest that is a manifestation of a 
broader patter in returns. IPO issuer returns are similar to benchmarks matched on firm size and 
book-to-market ratios but SEO returns show little underperformance related to various 
benchmarks. They argue that buy-and-hold returns (BHAR) magnify the underperformance and 
propose that significant underperformance found in many papers is caused by model 
misspecifications.
Jegadeesh (2000) on the other hand shows that evidence of SEOs long-term abnormal 
performance is robust, because it survives the best candidates for benchmark returns: equal- and 
value-weighted indexes, benchmark constructed based on firm-specific characters and factor- 
model benchmark. In addition he documents that SEOs underperform twice as much during the 
earnings announcement windows as they do outside the windows. He concludes that market is 
overly optimistic about the long-term prospects of SEOs at the time of issuance. He also argues 
that his evidence is inconsistent with Fama’s (1998) critique that long-term abnormal returns are 
caused by evaluation against wrong benchmark and therefore cross-sectional relations between 
firm characteristics causes the abnormal underperformance.
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2.3.3. Long-term effects of rights offerings
Burch et al. (2004) study the post-offer performance of right offers and firm commitment offers 
using data from the 1930s and 1940s. This time period allows them to compare the long-term 
performance of rights and public offerings using US data. They suggest that managers trying to 
exploit private information and issue overvalued equity are more likely to do so at the expense of 
new outside investors by choosing a firm commitment over a rights offering. They find that both 
issuance methods are associated with significantly positive abnormal performance before the 
offering. However the long-term performance following the offer differs significantly: the firm 
commitment firms have more negative abnormal returns during the year following the offer. 
They argue that this evidence shows that firms using rights offers are not timing their issues to 
capitalize on the overvalued equity and that the underperformance of firm commitments is tied to 
timing.
2.3.4. Firm and offering characteristics and long-term effects of equity 
offerings
The evidence concerning the relationship between the IPO volume and the long-term 
underperformance is somewhat ambiguous. Ritter (1991) finds that there are negative relation 
between annual volume and aftermarket performance. Similarly Loughran and Ritter (1995) 
document that the underperformance varies over years: the firms selling stock during high- 
volume periods are underperforming most. Lowry (2003) retests Ritter’s (1991) hypotheses with 
her own sample and argues that the statistical significance will disappear if value-weighted 
returns are used instead of equally-weighted. She suggests that the relation is sensitive to the 
model of expected returns. In addition Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) find that the 
underperformance is not concentrated in certain years.
Ritter (1991) finds that the industry in which the firm operates and the age of firm have 
considerable effect on the underperformance. He shows that the long-run performance varies 
considerably in different industries, for example financial institutions perform well and oil and
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gas firms outperform substantially during his sample period. In addition younger firms are found 
to have poorer long-tem performance than older ones.
The market perception of the offering quality is found to have significant effect on the long-term 
underperformance. For example Carter et al. (1998) study the relationship between the IPO long- 
run performance and underwriter reputation. They find that the better the underwriter reputation 
the less severe is the long-term underperformance. Their overall underperformance results are 
similar to Loughran and Ritter (1995) IPO-results. Michaely and Shaw (1994) report also that 
IPOs handled by lower-reputation underwriters have more negative long-run returns. Brav and 
Gompers ( 1997) find that venture-backed IPOs outperform non-venture-backed IPOs in the five 
years following the offer.
There are also papers studying if firms that have tried to maximize their valuation at the issuance 
by earnings management will suffer from poorer long-term performance. For example Teoh et al. 
(1998a) study the relation between earnings management and IPO long-term underperformance. 
They find that discretionary current accruals are good predictors of subsequent three-year 
abnormal performance. The buy-and-hold return differential between the aggressive and 
conservative earnings managers is 15 to 30%. Teoh et al. (1998b) test the effect of earnings 
management on the long-term underperformance of SEOs. They suggest that investors are not 
fully adjusting for the potential manipulation of reported earnings. Issuers post better net income 
growth figures in the offering year than non-issuers, but post-offering figures are significantly 
lower. The discretionary current accruals drive the post-offering earnings underperformance 
similarly as in the case of IPOs. The difference in post-offering stock return underperformance 
between the aggressive and conservative is even higher than the difference in IPO sample.
2.3.5. Statistical problems related to long-term return estimation
Numerous techniques are used in long-term event studies. However many of those techniques are 
suffering from statistical problems. For example Conrad and Kaul (1993) document a potential 
upward or downward bias if short-term abnormal returns are cumulated over long periods and
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suggest using holding-period returns. They argue that biases in short term returns, for example 
related to bid-ask spreads, nonsynchronous trading and price discreteness, are also cumulated 
when long-term returns are calculated using short-term returns.
One of the most popular methods used in measuring long-term abnormal stock price performance 
is the mean buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR). For example Barber and Lyon (1997) and 
Kothari and Warner (1997) have shown that BHAR method can produce biased estimates. They 
suggest that the biases can be eliminated by using carefully constructed benchmark portfolios and 
bootstrapping method. Fama (1998) argues also against the BHAR; he claims that systematic 
errors caused by imperfect expected return proxies are compounded with long-term returns. In 
addition BHAR ignores the cross-sectional dependence of event-firm abnormal returns that are 
overlapping in calendar time. He proposes a monthly calendar-time portfolio approach to 
measure long-term abnormal returns.
Barber et al. (1999) suggest that there are three causes for misspecification in tests for long-run 
abnormal returns. First there is a new listing or survivor bias that arises because sample firms are 
tracked for a long period and the firms included to the reference portfolio typically include firms 
that begin trading subsequent to the event month. Secondly the rebalancing bias arises because 
the compound returns of a reference portfolio are typically calculated assuming periodic 
rebalancing whereas the returns of sample firms are compounded without rebalancing. Thirdly 
the skewness bias arises because the distribution of long-run abnormal stock returns is positively 
skewed. This bias contributes also to the misspecification of the test statistics. They suggest that 
generally new listing biases are positive and other two negative.
Barber et al. (1999) propose two alternative approaches to control for these biases. First approach 
is based on BHAR method. The carefully constructed reference portfolio mitigates the new 
listing and rebalancing biases. There are two statistical methods that eliminate the skewness bias: 
a bootstrapped version of a skewness-adjusted t-statistics or empirical p-values calculated from 
the simulated distribution of mean long-run abnormal returns estimated from pseudoportfolios. 
However Barber et al. (1999) argue that these methods do not mitigate bias caused by cross- 
sectional dependence in sample observations and a poorly specified asset pricing model. The
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second approach proposed by Barber et al. (1999) is the calendar-time portfolio, which eliminates 
the cross-sectional dependence problem. However they comment that this approach does not 
precisely measure investors’ experience.
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) argue that the bootstrapping method has also statistical problems, 
because it assumes that event-firm abnormal returns are independent. They present evidence that 
cross-correlated abnormal returns have dramatically smaller test statistics even though the returns 
are similar in magnitude. Therefore they also advocate the use of calendar-time approach.
2.4. Disclosure of information
This part of the literature review includes brief presentation of theoretical models related to 
voluntary disclosure and its effect on asymmetric information. In addition empirical papers 
related to the effect of disclosure quality and special disclosure events on dispersion are 
presented. Then the effect of earnings release on the level of dispersion is shown. Finally some 
papers related to disclosure activity and dispersion around seasoned equity offerings are 
presented.
2.4.1. Theoretical papers
There are many theoretical papers related to voluntary disclosure and its effect on information 
asymmetry. For example Barry and Brown (1984, 1985) and Merton (1987) argue that voluntary 
disclosure lead to smaller information asymmetries between management and investors. 
Diamond and Verrecchia’s (1994) model also suggests that voluntary disclosure lead to smaller 
information asymmetries. They argue that especially large companies could decrease their cost of 
capital by larger disclosure.
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2.4.2. Disclosure quality and dispersion
Lang and Lundholm (1996) use the FAF reports9 to find the effect of analysts’ rankings of 
companies’ disclosure on the properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts. They find that firms with 
more informative disclosure have less dispersion in forecasts. In addition they show that forecast 
dispersion varies inversely with the market value of equity and number of analysts. They argue 
that the decrease in dispersion is caused by analyst giving less weight on their private information 
as the informativeness of firm-provided disclosure increases.
Heal y et al. (1995) find also that higher quality financial reporting is associated with smaller 
dispersion in financial analysts’ forecasts. Barron et al. (1999) find that companies with highly 
rated10 11Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) are associated with less dispersion in 
analysts’ forecasts. Healy et al. (1999) investigate whether companies with sustained 
improvements in disclosure experience improved stock performance and capital market 
intermediation. They expect to find that dispersion declines after expanded disclosure. The 
median dispersion of improver firms is comparable to peers before the change in disclosure and 
insignificantly lower during the event period.
Hope (2003) studies how firms’ disclosures of their accounting policies in the annual reports 
affect analyst forecasts using an international sample. He finds that the accounting policy 
disclosure" is negatively associated with forecast dispersion. He argues that increased accounting 
policy disclosure reduces the uncertainty about future earnings.
9 Report of the Financial Analysts Federation Corporate Information Committee, in those reports analysts evaluate 
the complete range of a firm’s disclosure, there are three summarizing scores: annual published information, other 
published information and investor relations.
0 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) conducted a review of a sample of MD&As in the late 1980s, 
Securities Act Release No. 6835 (May 18 1989)
11 The firm-level measurement done by Center for International Financial Analysis and Research
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2.4.3. Voluntary disclosure and dispersion
There are many papers studying the effect of management initiated voluntary disclosure on the 
forecast dispersion. For example Francis et al. (1997) report that manager’s presentations to 
security analysts have no effect on analysts’ forecast dispersion. Bowen et al. (2002) find that 
conference calls decrease dispersion in analysts’ forecasts during the quarter of conference call. 
Their sample is based on conference calls arranged before the adoption of Regulation Fair 
Disclosure12 and therefore the results may not be applicable anymore. Clement et al. (2003) study 
the confirming management earnings forecasts which are voluntary forecasts that corroborate 
existing market expectations. They find that uncertainty (dispersion) decreases around the 
confirming forecast date. Baginski et al. (1993) study the effect of precision of management 
earnings forecasts on dispersion and equity pricing. They document that if managers release a 
forecast with a relatively wide range, forecast dispersion will increase.
2.4.4. Earnings releases and dispersion
There are a few papers studying the effect of earnings releases on the level of dispersion. For 
example Morse et al. (1991) find that earnings forecasts become more dispersed after the annual 
earnings releases using I/B/E/S Summary reports. The divergence is greater if earnings release 
contains a bigger surprise. Their model assumes that analysts to disagree about the perceived 
accuracy of the signal. Brown and Han (1992) study the effect of annual earnings release on 
cross-sectional variance of analysts’ forecasts using I/B/E/S Detail data. Their results are 
different than the results of Morse et al. (1991). Significant decreases in variance are observed in 
the seven smallest categories of standardized surprise and significant increases happen only in the 
largest category. They suggest that consistent evidence cannot be obtained using I/B/E/S 
Summary data.
12 Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) prohibits selective disclosure of material information. There are many papers 
studying the effect of Reg FD on the dispersion, for example Bailey et al. (2003), Irani and Karamanou (2003) and 
Heflin et al. (2003)
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There are some papers that analyze how better quarterly disclosure affects the dispersion. For 
example Botosan and Harris (2000) study the companies that have initiated quarterly segment 
disclosures. They document that during the two-year period before the change year, the change 
firms experience an increase in information asymmetry (dispersion). However the change itself 
has not significant effect on dispersion. Swaminathan (1991) studies the effect of SEC 
requirement that multi-segment firms have to disclose segment revenue and income in their 10-K 
reports on divergence of beliefs. They find that divergence of beliefs (forecast variation 
coefficient) decrease and that the decrease is proportional to the number of segments
2.4.5. Disclosure around seasoned equity offerings
Lang and Lundholm’s (2000) paper studies the corporate disclosure activity around seasoned 
equity offerings. Firms have strong incentives to change their disclosure policy, because they can 
reduce their cost of equity capital by decreasing the information asymmetries11. The sample and 
control firms have comparable disclosure activity in terms of frequency and tone up to six 
months before the offering announcement. After the six-month break-point the issuing firms 
increase considerably their disclosure activity. Disclosures are made more frequently and more 
details and management interpretations are offered. Firms with selling shareholders disclose even 
more. Firms that maintain consistent level of disclosure experience stock price increases before 
the announcement, minor announcement effect and no abnormal performance after the offering. 
Hyping firms13 4 on the other hand have similar price run-up, much larger announcement effect and 
these stocks also underperform in the long-run.
There are many papers in addition to Lang and Lundholm (2000) that have studied the disclosure 
activity around public issuance. For example Healy et al. (1999) test if companies issue public 
securities more often after the increase in disclosure and they find that there are more offerings 
and also that the total dollar amount issued increases significantly. Gibbins et al. (1990) 
document that the frequency of issuance influences companies’ disclosure activity. Frankel et al.
13 Market conditioning disallowance in security laws limits companies’ actions
14 Firms that increase their disclosure activity before the offering, but don’t maintain the higher activity after the 
offering
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(1995) study the association between firm’s external financing decisions and their tendencies to 
disclose earnings forecasts. They find positive association over long-period of time. Ruland et al. 
(1990) find that firms that issue management forecasts are more likely to finance externally in the 
subsequent three months than companies which do not forecast. Issuing companies have also 
higher disclosure ratings (Lang and Lundholm, 1993).
Marquardt and Wiedman (1998) examine the impact of insider selling through equity offerings 
on the likelihood of management earnings forecasts and the overall level of information 
asymmetry prior to the registration of the offering. They find evidence that firms with managerial 
participation in the offering have increased voluntary disclosure and closer timing of the equity 
offering registration to the previous earnings announcement. Dispersion is higher if the 
management does not participate in the offering. There are two scenarios that can explain the 
evidence. First scenario is that managers decide to launch the offering when low information 
asymmetry is observed; managers time the equity offerings so that they can capitalize on the 
windows of opportunity. Second scenario is that after offering decision, active voluntary 
disclosure policy is chosen to lower the information asymmetry.
Korajczyk et al. (1991) present a theory that information asymmetry is at its lowest level at the 
time of an earnings release. They suggest that firm should issue risky securities when the market 
is most informed, because the more symmetric information will made announcement effect of the 
equity offering smaller. They find that announcements of stock offerings are clustered in the few 
weeks following the earnings announcements. Those releases are also unusually informative and 
often convey positive news. In addition they document that the price drop is increasing in time 
since preceding earnings release. They argue that their evidence is consistent with adverse 
selection affecting the pricing and timing of equity offerings.
Dierkens (1991) finds that the announcement effect of equity offerings varies systematically with 
residual variance. Her results show also that there is significant negative relationship between the 
residual variance and the time lag between announcement and earnings release. Firms have 
tendency to time their equity issuance soon after the preceding quarterly earnings announcement. 
There are equal amounts of bad and good news before the issuance and good/bad news division
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has no effect on the lag between earnings release and equity offering. She suggests that stocks 
with higher information asymmetries have bigger incentives to time their announcements of stock 
offerings closer to the earnings releases.
2.5. Rights offering paradox
Eckbo and Masulis’ (1992) model tries to explain firm’s choice of equity flotation method: 
uninsured rights, rights with standby underwriting or firm-commitment underwritten offers. In 
addition the model attempt to explain the disappearance of rights offerings in the United States. 
The preference for firm commitment offerings is a puzzle especially when rights offers have 
substantially lower direct flotation costs (Smith, 1977 and Eckbo and Masulis, 1992). Eckbo and 
Masulis suggest that the flotation costs of rights offerings can be low because of offer 
characteristics. With low return variance, high shareholder concentration and large blockholder 
guaranteeing the offering, also underwritten offers could have low costs.
Smith (1977) proposes that the paradox is caused by an agency problem; for example managers 
may receive personal benefits from underwriters. Managers can also face less strict shareholder 
monitoring if public offerings increase the shareholder dispersion. In addition the board may 
prefer the underwritten offers, because many companies have at least one investment banker in 
their board (Herman, 1981). There can be important shareholder-borne costs like capital gain 
taxes, transaction costs, and anti-dilution clauses causing wealth transfers to convertible-security 
holders, which are ignored or underestimated. (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992).
The model by Eckbo and Masulis tries to explain the choice of flotation method by adding cost 
named as adverse selection cost. Eckbo and Masulis (1992) model is an extension of Myers and 
Majluf (1984) model. The model allows more complex flotation methods and shareholders 
participation in the offering. In addition underwriters have informational role to play. The model 
assumes that issuer tries to maximize the benefits of firm’s current shareholders. It includes also 
an exogenous constraint which limits the amount that can be sold directly to shareholders.
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Eckbo and Masulis suggest that under-valued high shareholder participation issuers (=high k) 
select uninsured rights and inform the market about their high-к with subscription 
precommitments. Adverse-selection costs increase when к falls, since highly undervalued are 
now more likely not to issue. With enough low к-value firm choose firm commitment offer if it 
issues. Overvalued firms with high к can select uninsured right or firm commitment, if it wants to 
pool with undervalued low-к issuers. However there are risk that over-valuation is observed. 
Low-к companies choose the firm-commitment offers.
Eckbo and Masulis’ model suggests that right offerings have less negative announcement effect. 
In addition price run-up differs between the flotation methods, because only firm-commitments 
have it. The model suggests that the greater the information asymmetry between the issuer and 
the market, the greater the probability that the offering will be underwritten. Eckbo and Masulis 
also argue that issuers with transparent production technology or high levels of mandated 
disclosure are more likely to issue via rights.
3. Data and sample
This part of the thesis includes the description of data and sample collection and the descriptive 
analysis of the sample. In addition the estimation procedures used are presented in this section.
3.1. Sample and data collection
This section covers the description of sample and data collection process and also deals with 
some data problems that earlier research has pointed out.
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3.1.1. Sample collection
The sample used in this thesis includes companies of which stock has been included in Dow 
Jones STOXX 600 index between January I 1995 and December 3I 2005. The quarterly index 
selection lists are based on free-float market capitalization, 550 largest are always selected and 50 
out of stocks that are ranked between 551 and 75015. The index universe covers stocks that are 
traded on the major exchanges of 17 European countries16. Only the most liquid stock class is 
included in the index universe. Deleted index-components are immediately replaced by the 
largest non-component stock. The deletion may be caused by illiquidity; stock is deleted if it has 
not been traded for 10 consecutive days, trading is suspended or if there are ongoing bankruptcy 
proceedings. The deletion may also be caused by large IPO or spin-off, which replaces the 
smaller stock. Non-surviving M&A participants are deleted if certain conditions are met even if 
there is still trading on the stock.
I have included the stocks to the sample for whole sample period, even though the companies 
would not have been in the index for the whole period. Therefore the sample includes also 
bankruptcies, delistings, IPOs and M&A-actions. The sample replicates the European large stock 
universe and with this choice of sample needed data is available for great majority of stocks. 
Especially the I/B/E/S universe covers only limited amount of smaller stocks. The exclusion of 
smaller stocks can make the observed effects less dramatic, but also it is easier to formulate a 
profitable trading strategy.
3.1.2. Data collection and problems related to collected data
Total return indexes, which are drawn from Datastream, are used to calculate logarithmic returns. 
Market capitalization and price-to-book value data is also from Datastream. Returns and market
15 Before October 11, 1999 the number of stocks in the index wasn’t fixed to 600. I have included the component 
data of STOXX size indexes to the sample. There were also some changes in calculation methods. For more 
information see STOXX press release published on September 9, 1999.
16 The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. More information on index 
composition and calculation methods from STOXX Limited internet page: www.stoxx.com
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values are converted to US dollars. Book value per share data is collected from Worldscope. 
Analysts’ earnings estimate data is drawn from the I/B/E/S.
The equity offerings sample is collected from Thomson Financial New Issues Database with 
including only follow-on common stock offering excluding private placements. The sample 
includes all equity issues done by sample companies with restrictions explained here. The sample 
includes also the offerings that have launched before the index addition and therefore the results 
can be positively biased. I have rerun the long-run performance test with unbiased sample that 
includes only the offerings that sample companies have arranged after the first addition to the 
index. The new test results show that there is a small positive bias in reported overall results but 
the bias affects all portfolios similarly and therefore the dispersion effect has not changed17 and 
therefore I expect that the bias would change other results only at minor extent. Later research 
should confirm this suggestion. I have included only the successfully completed issues, because 
the long-run performance is one of the main subjects of this study. The issue date is required to 
be between January 1 1995 and December 31 2004. With these restrictions the initial sample size 
is 1513.
Diether et al. (2002) have found the standard-issue I/B/E/S data set unsuitable for their purposes, 
because I/B/E/S analysts’ forecasts are adjusted historically for stock splits in order to produce a 
smooth time series of earnings per share estimates. Historical estimates are reported as if the 
number of shares outstanding would have always been same as today. I/B/E/S reports the 
adjusted figures after rounding the estimates to the nearest cent. Therefore the standard deviation 
of earnings estimates can be zero even though it is has actually been positive. I do not have the 
unadjusted forecast data set available and also for my purposes I find this problem less severe. 
Diether et al. (2002)’ sample consists of much longer time-series which probably includes more 
splits. Also I am mainly interested in stocks with very high dispersion level, and those stocks are 
less likely to have zero standard deviation caused by rounding when compared to medium 
dispersion stocks. I assume that this may cause some minor bias to my results, which are making 
test procedures used less powerful.
17 The new results of long-run performance test are shown in the footnote 20
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I have used the Summary History data set of I/B/E/S data. This set includes the summary 
statistics calculated on a basis of all outstanding forecasts as of the third Thursday of each month. 
Diether et al. have calculated their own statistics based on Detail History file to make sure that 
non-current estimates are not used in calculation. Their own calculations track closely the values 
given in the Summary History data set. They run their test using both statistics and the results 
were similar and they reported therefore only the results based on Summary History file and 
therefore the choice of data set used was easy. This choice can make test methods less powerful, 
because some stocks may have spuriously high level of dispersion caused by undated earnings 
forecast used in calculation of summary statistics reported by I/B/E/S. I have used the earnings 
per share estimates for the current fiscal year, because this is the most forecasted figure. The 
dispersion figure in tests is the standard deviation of the forecast divided by book value per share 
at end of the fiscal year n-1.
The timing of equity offerings could cause some biases to the dispersion figure. The time lag 
between the release of forecasted annual EPS figure and the announcement of equity offering will 
vary lot in the sample. Figure 1 shows that offerings are quite equally arranged through the 
calendar year, except that there are more offerings in March and June and fewer offerings in 
August. I have no information about the financial years of the companies and therefore more 
precise measurement of the lag is impossible. The remaining forecasting period has effect on the 
dispersion. Brown et al. (1985) observe a uniform reduction of the dispersion throughout the 
fiscal year using US data. L’Her and Suret using Canadian data find that dispersion increase first 
four months and after that decreases. At the end of the fiscal year, the level of dispersion is 
approximately same as in the beginning of the year. Some researchers, for example Danielsen 
and Sorescu (2001) have used a weighting technique to account for this fact. Their technique 
gives higher weight to the observations where the lag is small. I have not used any technique, 
because I assume that companies time their equity offering based on their dispersion level and 
therefore they take this lag into account in timing.
Brown et al. (1985) point out that there is a lag between analyst forecast revision and their 
publication by I/B/E/S. O’Brien (1988) finds an average delay of 34 trading days between an 


































































































































the most current forecasts available are more accurate than mean or median of all available 
forecasts. In addition to that Morse et al. (1991) point out that there is also delay by some 
analysts in updating their forecasts. This lag has no effect to my results because I only use 
dispersion level that is measured before the offering and therefore the potential effect of the 
offering on the dispersion is not included to my dispersion figures. The level is measured at one 
month before the month including the issue date, to exclude the effect of equity offering 
announcement on dispersion.
Many papers using dispersion have added a constraint that there must be certain number of valid 
estimates for the company. For example L’Her and Suret (1996) demand that at least 6 analysts 
have issued earnings forecast. 1 have not use any restrictions except the natural one that at least 
two forecasts are needed to calculate the standard deviation. My sample consists mainly of big 
companies with large following and therefore the problems related to low following have less 
material impact on my results compared to studies using the whole I/B/E/S universe. In addition I 
divide the sample only to two to four portfolios based on the dispersion level and therefore my 
estimates are not so sensitive to bias caused by small following compared to studies using more 
subtle partition of the sample.
3.2. Descriptive analysis of data
Figure 2 shows the annual division of the offerings. Years 1995 and 1996 have fewer public 
offerings than average year and year 2000 have more public offerings. The overall division is 
quite level. The frequency of public offerings has slightly increased through the years. The 
frequency of rights offerings has not increased, and this is probably related to the fact that 
companies are increasingly favoring public offerings. There are more rights offerings in years 


































































































Table 1: The country composition of the offerings
This table shows the country composition of the total sample and
sample divided to public and rights offerings.
Country All Offerings Public Offerings Rights Offerings
Austria 2.1% 1.9% 3.0%
Belgium 1.9% 2.3% 0.0%
Denmark 2.4% 2.4% 2.3%
Finland 3.4% 3.7% 1.9%
France 13.9% 14.2% 12.4%
Germany 9.2% 8.0% 15.0%
Greece 2.1% 2.3% 0.8%
Ireland 2.1% 2.2% 1.9%
Italy 5.4% 4.3% 10.5%
Netherlands 6.1% 7.1% 1.5%
Norway 2.8% 3.2% 1.1%
Portugal 2.3% 1.4% 6.0%
Spain 5.6% 6.3% 2.6%
Sweden 3.1% 2.7% 5.2%
Switzerland 4.2% 4.1% 4.9%
United Kingdom 33.4% 34.0% 31.1%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
The Table 1 presents the country composition of the issuers. Approximately one third of the 
issuers are British and both German and French issuers have about 10% share of the offerings. 
Finnish issuers have arranged 3.4% of the offerings. Many countries have big differences in the 
relative frequency of rights and public offerings. For example Austria, Germany, Italy, Portugal 
and Sweden have relatively more rights offerings in the sample than public offerings. On the 
other hand Belgium, Finland, Greece, Netherlands, Norway and Spain have relatively more 
public offerings. The remaining countries have almost equal percentage in both issuing methods.
Table 2 shows the macro industry composition of the issuing companies. Financials is biggest 
industry with approximately 20% share of the sample. Energy, high technology, industrials, 
materials and telecommunications have all approximately 10% share of the issuers. There are 
large differences in the likelihood of rights offerings in different macro industries. For example 
consumer products and services, healthcare, high technology, media and entertainment and 
telecommunications favor public offerings and consumer staples, financials, industrials and
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materials favor rights offerings. As a conclusion companies selling direct to consumers are more 
likely to arrange a public offering.
Table 2: The industry composition of the offerings
This table shows the industry com 
public and rights offerings.
Macro Industry
position of the total sample and sample divided to
All Offerings Public Offerings Rights Offerings
Consumer Products and Services 6.0% 6.4% 3.8%
Consumer Staples 4.2% 3.7% 6.7%
Energy and Power 8.5% 8.6% 7.9%
Financials 21.7% 21.0% 25.1%
Healthcare 3.9% 4.3% 1.9%
High Technology 10.1% 10.8% 6.7%
Industrials 11.6% 10.9% 15.0%
Materials 9.4% 8.3% 14.6%
Media and Entertainment 7.9% 8.8% 4.1%
Real Estate 2.8% 2.8% 3.0%
Retail 5.0% 4.7% 6.0%
Telecommunications 8.9% 9.7% 5.2%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 3 shows more descriptive statistics about the offerings. The average (median) offering size 
measured with total principal sold in all markets is 556 million USD (196 million USD). The 
average and median rights offers are bigger than public offers. The mean (median) proportional 
size measured with total principal of the offering divided by the market capitalization at the 
month before the offering month is 20.1% (7.3%). Rights offers have much higher proportional 
size in every measure except the mean, which is only somewhat higher. This fact is caused by the 
higher offering size and smaller issuers. Financially distressed companies are more likely to 
choose rights offerings and these offerings have very high proportional size. The average 
(median) market capitalization of the issuer at one month before the offering is 10 264 million 
USD (3 412 million USD). The market capitalization of the issuers choosing to use a rights offer 
method is only about a half of the market capitalization of issuers launching public offers. Book- 
to-market ratio measured at one month before the offering month is in average (median) 0.46 
(0.39). Rights offers have much higher book-to-market ratios. Companies launching rights
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offerings have no motive to issue overvalued equity and this can be seen easily from the book-to- 
market ratios.
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of the offerings and issuing companies
Descriptive statistics related to offering size, proportional offering size, market capitalization and book-to- 
market ratios are included in this table. Offering size is total proceeds of the offering in all markets combined. 
Proportional offering size is the offering size divided by market capitalization. Market capitalization and 
offering size are based on figures measured month before the offering month.
All Offerings
Offering size Proportional size Market Cap Book-to-Market
Mean 556 20.1% 10 264 0.46
Lower Quartile 90 2.7% 1 340 0.21
Median 196 7.3% 3 412 0.39
Upper Quartile 538 15.2% 9 892 0.64
Rights Offerings
Offering size Proportional size Market Cap Book-to-Market
Mean 703 23.6% 5 593 0.58
Lower Quartile 107 10.0% 769 0.30
Median 268 16.0% 1 736 0.52
Upper Quartile 735 28.3% 4 977 0.75
Public Offerings
Offering size Proportional size Market Cap Book-to-Market
Mean 524 19.4% 11 269 0.43
Lower Quartile 86 2.3% 1 478 0.19
Median 188 5.6% 3 928 0.37
Upper Quartile 476 12.2% 10 951 0.61
Offering size and market capitalization are measured in million offering-time US dollars.
3.3. Estimation methods
I calculate long-term abnormal returns using two different methods: the buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns method (BHAR) and calendar time method. BHAR-method is used in post-performance 
tests and price run-up tests. Calendar-time method is used only in post-performance tests. In both 
methods the abnormal returns are calculated using size and price-to-book matched reference 
portfolios. The method to calculate the returns of reference portfolios is similar to what Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998) used in their paper. This kind of sequential sort procedure is also used by for
43
example Renberry et al (1995), Barber and Lyon (1997), Barber et al. (1998) and Kothari and 
Warner (1997). I treat my sample of stocks that have been included in Stoxx-600 index as 
investment universe. I divided this universe to four portfolios based on the market capitalization 
at the beginning of the month and every one of these four portfolios was divided to four 
portfolios based on price-to-book ratios. As a total, 16 portfolios are formed and the composition 
of these portfolios is changed every month by rebalancing based on the changes in size and price- 
to-book ratio. The average return of stocks in the matching portfolio is used in calculation of 
abnormal returns in the same calendar month for the stocks with similar size and price-to-book 
class.
Rao and Vermaelen (1998) point out that monthly rebalancing avoid some problems related to 
annual rebalancing or matching firm methods; because it takes account the changes in size and 
price-to-book that happen over the year. They show that most firms change their portfolio 
assignments during the sample period. Therefore they argue that annual rebalancing or match 
firm methods does not adequately control for the changing risk characteristics. However the 
chosen method can exacerbates the rebalancing, new listing and skewness bias documented by 
Barber et al. (1999).
I calculate firm-specific holding period return and these returns were averaged to get the mean 
BHAR. Using holding period returns instead of summing short-period abnormal returns will 
eliminate the bias documented by Conrad and Kaul (1993). I study the statistical significance of 




There are problems associated with the use of standard t-test. For example Rau and Vermaelen 
(1998) point out that many of its assumptions like the normality, stationarity and time 
independence of observations can be broken in reality. Barber et al. (1999) show that the t-test 
statistics are biased because of long-horizon BHARs are positively skewed and this leads to 
negatively biased t-statistics.
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To eliminate the skewness bias in t-statistics, I calculate the skewness-adjusted t-statistics 
developed by Johnson (1978):
i—( 1 It,a =V^ S+~jS2+ — r
V 3 on y
(3)
Where
However I do not use the bootstrapped version of this skewness-adjusted t-statistics, which 
Barber et al. (1999) propose. They suggest that only the bootstrapped version and empirical p- 
values based on simulated distribution of mean BHARs estimated from pseudoportfolios will 
eliminate the skewness bias totally.
My main tests are t-tests that compare the abnormal returns in different portfolios. The high- 
dispersion portfolio is compared to low-dispersion portfolio. All these portfolios are expected to 
have similar kind of biases and therefore these difference tests should be unbiased. I am using 
basic t-test assuming unequal variances in these tests.
BHAR-method suffers from biases caused by cross-sectional dependence in sample observation. 
This bias can be eliminated by using calendar-time portfolio (Barber et al., 1999). Calendar-time 
portfolio method has also been advocated by Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000). 
Therefore I also use the calendar-time method to estimate the abnormal performance and its 
statistical significance.
I use the method similarly as Barber et al. (1999). First I calculate the abnormal return for each 
security using the returns of the size and price-to-book matched reference portfolios:
(4)
45
Then I calculate a mean abnormal return (MAR) across firms in the portfolio for each calendar 
month t:
MAR, = (5)
nt is the number of firms in the portfolio in month t. These returns are equally weighted. Then 
grand mean monthly abnormal return (MMAR) is calculated:
MMAR = — ^ MAR, 
T ,=1
(6)
T is a total number of months in the sample period. The statistical significance of MMAR is 
estimated using formula below:
t(MMAR) = MMAR 
<j(MAR, )/yfr
(7)
Announcement date tests are based on short-term abnormal returns that are calculated cumulating 
daily abnormal returns, which are calculated by formula:
AR, = *,-R, (8)
Ri, is the daily return of STOXX-600 total return index. This formula assumes that all companies 
have beta of one and no adjustments for size or book-to-market are done.
The relationship between right vs. public offering decision and dispersion level at the month 
before the offering month is tested using Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test. This test uses 
observations’ Wilcoxon scores, which are the ranks of the observations. I have used the average 
ranks for tied values. This test tests if the ranks of two groups are evenly distributed.
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4. Theory and hypotheses
This section covers the theory how dispersion will affect the seasoned equity offerings and stock 
returns around them. First the theory is explained in overall level and then I show what kind of 
effect the forecast dispersion should have on price run-up. announcement effect and long-run 
underperformance based on the theory. In addition the theory about opportunistic companies is 
explained. Finally the main hypotheses are shown.
4.1. Theory
This theory explains the effect of financial analysts’ EPS forecast dispersion on the equity 
issuance process. The basic framework is based on Miller’s (1977) model. Investors’ valuation 
for the company stock vary and they trade based on their own valuations. Miller assumes that 
markets for shorting a stock are not perfect. Short-sale costs can be too high for profitable trading 
or shorting services can be unavailable. Empirical tests by Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) show 
that short-sale constraints can be significant. D’Avolio (2002) also shows interesting results that 
short-sale constraints are higher among high-dispersion stocks. Investors with pessimist valuation 
are therefore excluded from the market and stock price is based on only the high-valuation by 
optimist investors. Stocks with high divergence of opinion are bid up by optimists and therefore 
those stocks become overvalued.
Diether et al. (2002) propose that in addition to short-sale constraints, any friction that prevents 
the revelation of negative information can exclude the negative investors from the market. They 
suggest that for example the incentive structure of analysts can cause the revelation. Self- 
censoring can cause analysts to stop following the stocks of which they have negative view and 
therefore the reported forecasts are upward biased. High-dispersion stocks are associated with 
more self-censoring and therefore these stocks are overvalued.
The model assumes that there are two different kinds of stocks in the market, high-dispersion 
stocks and stocks with normal or low dispersion level. The magnitude of valuation errors is
assumed to be higher among the high-dispersion stocks. The high divergence of opinion causes 
these stocks to be valued above the level that average investor seems to be fair. These stocks are 
harder to value, because these companies are associated with lower quality and less frequent 
disclosure. For example Lang and Lundholm (1996), Heal y et al. (1995) and Barron et al. (1999) 
have found empirical evidence for this association. The unavailability of important information in 
addition to uncertain and potentially biased information disclosed can cause the valuation of 
average investor to be downward or upward biased compared to management valuation. 
Therefore the magnitude of undervaluation is higher among the high-dispersion companies than 
among other companies. Stocks with smaller short-sale constraints are more often undervalued. 
Stocks with low or normal divergence of opinion are not bid up much above their fair valuation 
and less uncertain information available makes the market valuation more correct.
The issuance decision and the choice of issuance method can be analyzed using the theoretical 
framework presented above. The availability of positive net present value (NPV) projects and the 
financial slack of the company are also affecting the issuance decision. The model assumes that 
financial slack includes also the possibilities to issue debt or convertible securities. In addition 
investment banks’ underwriting decisions are affected by the issuers’ level of dispersion. I 
assume that managers’ act similarly as Myers and Majluf’s (1984) model suggests. Their model 
is based on assumption that managers have superior information about the firm, for example they 
know if company stock is bid up to overvalued by optimists. Because of the superior information, 
there are asymmetric information between the managers and the investors in the market. 
Managers act in best interests of old shareholders and therefore they have a motive to issue 
overvalued equity. There is also empirical evidence that managers decide to issue equity when 
company stock is over-valued. Gentry and Mayer (2003) showed using Real Estate Investment 
Trusts that managers rarely issue equity when the price-to-NAV is below one and when the ratio 
is above one, then the likelihood of issuance rises rapidly. Clarke et al. (2001) show direct 
evidence that insiders attempt to issue overvalued equity in SEOs and the issues are cancelled if 
the over-valuation is eliminated.
Overvalued high-dispersion stocks are likely to choose public offerings. The issuance decision is 
not much affected by the company’s need of capital, because the issuance of overvalued equity
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itself is a positive NPV investment to current shareholders. However the issuance decision is 
affected by the investment banks actions. Highly prestigious investment banks are not eager to 
offer underwriting services to high-dispersion stocks, because their reputation may erode if they 
underwrite highly overvalued shares. I expect that the limit for the dispersion is negatively related 
to the offering size, because power of smaller offerings to erode the reputation is small. 
Investment banks with lower reputation can underwrite these offerings, but investors are not 
willing to pay the same price for these offerings. The lower offer price decreases the profitability 
of issuance and therefore big discounts to market price make issuers to cancel the offering. The 
investment banks decisions are also affected by investors’ optimism, because during the periods 
of high investors’ optimism also poorer offerings are well-accepted. This can cause the SEO 
volume to be positively associated with the dispersion.
Overvalued companies with too high level of dispersion have two choices if they want to issue 
equity. First they can delay the offering and try to decrease the level of dispersion by better 
disclosure and at the same suffer from the risk that over-valuation will disappear. Secondly they 
can choose to launch a rights offering. In both cases the issuance loses the positive NPV status 
and the financial slack and the NPV of the project become relevant factors. The rights offering 
has one advantage over delaying the issuance because investors can pool these companies with 
the undervalued companies that usually are more likely to arrange a rights offerings and therefore 
the choice of rights offering can allow the company to maintain the overvaluation. This suggested 
reason for rights offering is contrary to Eckbo and Masulis’ (1992) suggestion that greater 
information asymmetry is associated with greater probability of public offerings. However they 
do not consider the investment banks’ perspective, but only the company’s perspective. I argue 
that some companies would like to launch a public offering instead of rights offering and that 
Eckbo and Masulis’ model works only if every company could obtain an underwriter.
The under- and correctly valued high-dispersion stocks have different choices. Their choice of 
issuance is strongly affected by their financial slack and their NPV of the investment projects 
available. The potential to delay the investment has also a big impact on the issuance decision. 
Companies with urgent need of cash to finance investment projects with positive NPV are likely 
to choose rights offering, because that decision is in the best interests of current shareholders.
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Many of these companies are struggling in poor financial situation and thus the positive NPV 
could arise simply from lower costs of financial distress. If the need is not urgent, then companies 
have another option: to start better disclosure. Less uncertain information can decrease the level 
of dispersion but it is also likely to increase the market valuation, because after the disclosure less 
biased estimates can be done. Companies with enough financial slack or no positive NPV 
projects available do not issue equity, because without the need of extra money, the issuance 
would be costly.
The more correctly valued low- and normal dispersion companies have three choices: public 
offerings, rights offerings and non-issuance. Companies with a lack of financial slack and 
positive NPV investment available choose the public offering if there is at least light over­
valuation. However the magnitude of over-valuation is low because of low over-valuation, and 
therefore these offerings are zero-NPV projects. Correctly priced and under-valued companies 
may also choose rights offering, if existing shareholders take up is high. Companies with 
financial slack or no profitable investment available choose not to issue.
4.2. The effect of dispersion on the price run-up
I expect that the over-valued stocks with high-dispersion are associated with higher price run-up 
than other public offerings, if these stocks are experienced considerable increases in their 
dispersion level before the offering. The increase in dispersion causes the price to increase, 
because the optimists bid up the price. However the time period between the increase in 
dispersion and the offering can vary lot and therefore the results of price run-up tests can be 
sensitive to the duration of test period.
The over-valued high-dispersion stocks, which are obliged to launch a rights offering are 
associated with similar kind of price run-up, than similar stocks with public offerings. The under­
and correctly valued high-dispersion stocks are expected to have negative stock price 
performance before the rights offering. The stock price performance of high-dispersion rights 
offering depends on the division of these cases to over- and undervalued stocks.
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Low- and normal dispersion stocks launching a rights offering are associated with the normal 
stock price performance before the offering and stocks choosing the public offering have small 
price run-up.
4.3. The effect of dispersion on the announcement effect
The negative signal associated with the announcement of public offering causes the investors to 
adjust their valuations downwards. High-dispersion issuers have more negative announcement 
effect, because negative signal has bigger impact on optimistic valuation than on pessimistic 
valuation. The disappointed optimists adjust their valuation downwards, because they realize that 
stock is overvalued. Pessimists are not disappointed, because their valuation is lower than the 
market price before the announcement and therefore only small adjustment may occur. In the 
case of low-dispersion stock the marginal investors are only moderate optimistic and therefore 
their disappointment is quite small causing only a small adjustment. In addition I argue that the 
marginal investors do not adjust stock prices perfectly to eliminate the whole overvaluation 
immediately at the announcement, because they assume that the stocks are less overvalued than 
those are in reality. Investors also tend to underreact to reliable information and therefore only 
part of the overvaluation is eliminated at the announcement (Griffin and Tversky, 2003).
In the case of rights offerings, management has no incentive to sell over-valued equity and 
therefore the announcement effect should be smaller than in the case of public offerings. These 
stocks may have small negative effect, because of the costs related to offering. However the 
announcement effect can also be positive, because of the positive NPV investment available. As a 
conclusion I assume that the announcement of rights offerings should have only a minor effect. In 
addition I expect that the dispersion does not have major impact on the announcement effect of 
rights offerings.
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4.4. The effect of dispersion on the long-run underperformance
Companies arranging public offerings are using windows of opportunities by taking advantage of 
over-valuation. The adjustment process that begins at the announcement will continue until the 
over-valuation is eliminated. Optimists will be disappointed if the new equity capital raised in the 
offering does not start yielding as well as they assumed and they continue adjusting their 
valuations closer to pessimistic valuations and this causes the divergence of opinion to decrease. 
The disappointment is more pronounced among the high-dispersion stocks. High-dispersion 
stocks are more over-valued and therefore they need to earn higher real rates of returns to make 
the realized returns to high enough. This is difficult to accomplish especially when they do not 
need positive NPV investment to be motivated to launch a public offering. In addition companies 
have to disclose at least mandatory information and this information can decrease the dispersion 
level, especially when the motives to disclose biased information are smaller after the offering. 
This decrease in dispersion also causes the over-valuation of high-dispersion stocks to become 
smaller as Miller’s (1977) model suggests. High-dispersion stocks should therefore have more 
negative performance following the offer. The post-offering performance can be even more 
negative following the hot equity issuance market, because during those periods companies with 
very high dispersion can also launch public offerings and therefore issuers are associated with 
higher level over-valuation.
The case of rights offerings is different, because these stocks are not using windows of 
opportunities. In the case of high-dispersion companies the over-valued stocks are assumed to 
underperform because they have to disclose at least the mandatory information and dispersion 
should therefore decrease. On the other hand the undervalued high-dispersion stocks are assumed 
to outperform, because those stocks can exceed the market expectations easily and also the 
uncertainty is assumed to decrease because of active disclosure policy. Therefore empirical tests 
will solve the sign of long-term performance of high-dispersion rights offerings. The low- 




Lang and Lundholm’s (2000) find that stocks that increase their disclosure significantly before 
the offering are likely to be associated with higher price run-up, and more negative 
announcement effect and long-term performance. I assume that this effect is also related to the 
dispersion, but this time to the decrease in dispersion. I also assume that this opportunistic 
company theory is independent of the theory explained above. Companies in all dispersion levels 
have motive to spuriously increase their market capitalization before the offering and to try to 
make their own windows of opportunities. However the stocks with very high dispersion levels 
have smaller motive than other stocks, because they are afraid that opportunistic behavior will 
expose their overvaluation to the market.
The opportunistic behavior of these companies includes very active disclosure policy with 
positive tone and earnings management. Empirical dispersion literature has shown that voluntary 
disclosure can decrease the level of dispersion1* and voluntary disclosure theories|y have 
suggested that this decrease in dispersion is associated with positive stock price performance. 
These companies can make the windows of opportunity even better through the use of earnings 
management. For example Teoh et al. (1998a, 1998b) have shown that companies with high 
amounts of discretionary current accruals, predictor of earnings management, have suffered from 
poorer long-term underperformance following the offer than other companies.
I therefore expect that the most opportunistic companies, companies with biggest decrease in 
dispersion before the offering, are associated with price run-up, and poor announcement effect 
and long-term performance. At the announcement market participants partially realize that the 
opportunistic companies have manipulated their stock prices up. These companies cannot fill the 
investors’ expectations following the offer and poor post-offer performance follows.
18 For example Lang and Lundholm (1996), Healy et al. (1995). Barron et al. (1999), Bowen et al. (2002), Clement et 
al. (2003) etc.
19 For example Diamond and Verrecchia (1994), Barry and Brown (1985), Merton (1987) etc.
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4.6. Main hypotheses
These are the main test hypotheses:
Companies launching public offerings:
1. Stocks with high-dispersion have higher price run-up than other stocks
2. Stocks with high-dispersion have more negative announcement effect than other stocks
3. Stocks with high-dispersion have more negative long-run performance after the offering 
than other stocks
4. Companies with high dispersion have increased likelihood of rights offering
5. Opportunistic companies disclose good information before the offering and have thus 
large changes in dispersion. Therefore these companies should be associated with high 
price run-up, poor announcement effect, highly negative post-offering performance
5. Test Results
In this part I show the test results based on the hypothesis presented at the end of the previous 
section. Stocks are required to have return and market capitalization data for 12 months following 
the offer, book-to-market data for the 12 months before the offering and dispersion data for the 
month before the offer month to be included in the initial sample. The abnormal returns of 
delisted stocks are assumed to be zero after the delisting. This sample makes it possible to 
estimate the post-offering long-term performance. In other tests, offerings which do not fulfill the 
extra requirements are eliminated. The initial sample size is 1336, of which 1106 are public 
offering and 230 rights offerings. The portfolio limits are based on the initial sample and are 
equal in every test. Same limits are used to make sure that stock is always in the same portfolio. 
The public offering sample is divided to four portfolios and rights offering sample to two 
portfolios based on the dispersion level at the month before the offering month. Less subtle 
division of rights offering sample is related to considerably lower sample size. The 
announcement date tests use slightly higher sample because only few days’ returns and the
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dispersion figure measured at one month before the offering month are needed. However the 
limits used are same. The public offering sample is again divided to four portfolios and rights 
offering sample to two portfolios based on the dispersion level at the month before the offering 
month.
5.1. Price run-up before the SEO
Stocks without return data or data for size or book-to-market adjustment for the year before the 
offering are excluded from the initial sample to get the sample for price run-up tests. After these 
extra requirements the sample size totals 1258, of which 1030 are public offerings and 228 rights 
offers. The abnormal returns used in tests are size- and book-to-market adjusted as explained in 
the data section. The sample period is from 12 months before the offering month to month before 
the issuance month. Both standard and skewness-adjusted t-statistics are presented.
Public offerings are associated with price run-up phenomena as you can see from the Table 4. All 
portfolios based on the dispersion level outperform their size and book-to-market adjusted 
reference portfolios. The high-dispersion stocks have the highest excess returns before the 
offering. The return of 12.91% is significant at 0.1% level (l% level if only standard t-test is 
applied). Other groups have abnormal returns in a range of 8.35% to 9.59%. All these returns are 
significantly different from zero at 0.1% level. These results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that high-dispersion stocks have higher price run-up. However the difference between the low 
and high-dispersion portfolio is not statistically significant (p-value is only 0.17), therefore the 
evidence about higher price run-up is not very strong. The dispersion change analysis shows that 
75% of these stocks have had positive change during the year before the offering, and 66% of 
offerings have change bigger than 75th percentile. The overall price run-up phenomenon is 
consistent with the earlier empirical evidence, for example Tripathy and Rao (1992) and Asquith 
and Mullins (1986) have found similar returns, however the duration of their test periods is much 
shorter. Based on the Figures 3 and 4 the price run-up phenomenon lasts quite long and therefore 
longer sample period is valid choice.
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Table 4: Price run-up test results
The table shows the abnormal returns preceding the seasoned equity offering. The public offer 
sample is divided to four portfolios based on the financial analysts' earnings per share forecast 
dispersion at the month preceding the offering. The rights offerings sample is divided to two portfolios 
based on dispersion level at the month preceding the offering. The abnormal returns are size- and 
book-to-market adjusted buy-and-hold returns. Those returns are calculated for the 12-month period 
starting at one year before the offering.
Public Offerings
Dispersion at one month before the offering month
Less than 25% Less than 50% Less than 75% More than 75%
Abnormal returns 8.96% 8.35% 9.59% 12.91%
t-value 4.96 **** 4.24 **** 4.70 **** 3.31 ***
Skew-adj. T-value д уд **** 0 **** ^ y-j **** 0 gg ****
Rights Offerings
Dispersion at one month before the offering month
Less than 50% More than 50%
Abnormal returns 6.46% -12.78%
t-value 2.30 ** -1.80 *
Skew-adj. T-value 2.36 ** -1.97 *
Statistical significance is based on basic Student t-test and skewness-adjusted t-tests. **** denotes 
that the value is significant at 0.1% level. *** denotes that the value is significant at the 1% level. ** 
denotes that the value is significant at the 5% level. * denotes that the value is significant at the 10% 
level. ________________________________ ________
The results related to rights offers can also be found in the Table 4. High-dispersion stocks are 
associated with poor performance before the offering. The return of -12.78% is significant at 10% 
level. The low-dispersion stocks have smaller price run-up of 6.46% (significant at 5% level). 
The abnormal returns of high-dispersion stocks are significantly different from the returns of low- 
dispersion stocks at 1% level. The results show that the abnormal returns of the undervalued 
high-dispersion stocks, of which many companies have financial difficulties, are so low that the 
positive abnormal returns of overvalued high-dispersion stocks are not high enough to change the 
returns of this portfolio positive. Unexpectedly the low-dispersion stocks outperform, my theory 
suggests that these stocks should have normal performance before the offering. The price run-up 
of these stocks may be related to early rights offerings in the sample, because much higher rights 
offering frequency could be related to some institutional constraints that favored the use of rights 









































































































































































































































































































































































































The Figure 3 is related to the price run-up of public offering portfolios. All public offer portfolios 
outperform their reference portfolios steadily; however the high-dispersion group has somewhat 
higher abnormal returns during the last eight months of the test period. Other portfolios have no 
considerable differences between each others. The whole sample has abnormal return of 9.9% 
during the one year period. The return is highly significant (0.1% significance level).
The cumulative abnormal returns of rights offers during the year before the offerings are shown 
in the Figure 4. Rights offerings have normal performance until 10 months before the issuance 
month. After that the high-dispersion stocks start to underperform steadily and low-dispersion 
stocks on the other hand start to have positive abnormal returns. The whole sample has almost 
equal returns to their reference portfolios. The abnormal return of -3.1% is statistically 
insignificant.
5.2. Announcement effect of SEOs
I study the effect of dispersion on the announcement effect using issue date data, because the 
announcement day data was unobtainable. Mikkelson and Partch (1986) find that there is 
statistically significant decline in the stock price at the issue date, however the magnitude of this 
decline is small compared to announcement date. This lower magnitude may cause the test to 
become less powerful and therefore the effect of dispersion can be more difficult to find. In 
addition it is potential that issue date effect is caused by different factors than the announcement 
effect for example factors related to liquidity can explain the negative abnormal returns at the 
issuance and therefore the dispersion effect should be nonexistent. However I test if my 
hypotheses are relevant also using this data.
The sample will include the stocks with return data for the days -5 to +10 and the dispersion level 
data measured at one month before the offering month available. This requirement leads to 
sample including 231 rights offers and 1115 public offers. The abnormal returns are calculated 
using only market-adjustment, with market returns based on the returns of STOXX-600 total- 
return index and assuming that the beta of every stock is equal to one. The significance reported 
is based on standard t-test.
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Table 5 shows the cumulative abnormal returns for two days’ window starting at the day before 
the issue day. All portfolios based on the dispersion level have negative returns, between -0.45% 
and -1.16%. However, the high dispersion portfolio has slightly less negative (-0.45%) and 
insignificant returns. The returns of other dispersion level portfolios are significantly different 
from zero at least at 1% significance level. These results are not consistent with the hypothesis 
that high-dispersion stocks have the most negative announcement effect. This inconsistency 
could be related with the use of issue date data rather than announcement dates.
The overall results are consistent with the Mikkelson and Partch (1986) results and my 
hypothesis that public offerings have negative effect at the announcement. The magnitude of the 
effect is similar to Gajevsky and Ginlinger (2002) who studied the announcement effect of 
French public offerings. However many papers using non-US sample, for example Cooney et al. 
(1997) and Slovin et al. (2000) have found even nonnegative announcement effects. My results 
are inconsistent with papers studying the announcement effect using US data, for example 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Masulis and Korwar (1986) and Asquith and Mullins (1986) that 
have found approximately -3% return at the announcement. However the effect can be different 
in the case of non-US stocks, as many papers suggest, and therefore the inconsistency with the 
US results is not big surprise.
The abnormal returns around the issue date of rights offerings are also shown in the Table 5. 
These figures are consistent with the announcement date hypotheses that rights offerings have 
smaller announcement effect than public offers and that the sign of the announcement effect can 
be positive or negative. I assume that the negative announcement effect of high-dispersion stocks 
may be related to higher impact of issuing costs in the case of financially distressed companies. 
The positive announcement effect of low-dispersion stocks is related to positive NPV investment 
in which the proceeds are invested. The high dispersion portfolio has negative abnormal return of 
-0.56% and low dispersion portfolio positive (0.33%). However both these abnormal returns are 
not significantly different from zero. In addition there is no statistically significant difference 
between the returns of these portfolios based on t-test. These returns are more positive than found 
in papers by for example Eckbo and Masulis (1992), Gajevsky and Ginlinger (2002) and Hansen
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(1988). The results are consistent with Smith’s (1977) results. However, only Gajevsky and 
Ginlinger (2002) uses non-US sample with more current sample period.
Table 5: Announcement (issue date) effect test results
The table shows the abnormal returns around the issue date of the seasoned equity offering. The 
public offer sample is divided into four portfolios based on the financial analysts' earnings per share 
forecast dispersion at the month preceding the offering. The rights offerings sample is divided into 
two portfolios based on dispersion level at the month preceding the offering. The abnormal returns 
are calculated using simple formula: return of the stock - return of the STOXX-600 index. Those 





Dispersion at one month before the offering month
Less than 50% More than 50%
Abnormal returns 0.33% -0.56%
t-value 0.72 -0.95
Statistical significance is based on basic Student t-test. **** denotes that the value is significant at 
0.1% level. *** denotes that the value is significant at the 1% level. ** denotes that the value is 
significant at the 5% level. * denotes that the value is significant at the 10% level.
Dispersion at one month before the offering month
Less than 25% Less than 50% Less than 75% More than 75% 
-0.76% -1.16% -0.69% -0.45%
-3.03*“ -4.85““ -2.77“* -1.21
The Figure 5 shows the abnormal returns surrounding the issue date of public offerings and as 
you can see from the Figure 5 all portfolios have similar pattern. There are positive abnormal 
returns before the issue date. Day before and the issue date are associated with negative abnormal 
returns. Finally there is a recovery after the issue date. Portfolio with stocks having dispersion 
below median but above the 25% percentile underperforms others.
The Figure 6 shows the cumulative abnormal returns from the day -5 to day +10 around the issue 
date of rights offerings. As you can see from the Figure 6, both portfolios have negative abnormal 
returns before the issue date. The portfolio with low dispersion stocks recovers strongly and 
cumulative abnormal returns become positive. The total sample has no considerable drift to be 

























































































































































































































Figure 5: The announcement (issue date) effect of public offerings
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5.3. Long-term effect of SEOs
The sample size is 1336, of which 1106 are public offering and 230 rights offerings. The data 
requirements related to this sample are explained in the beginning of the results part. The 
significance reported here is based on both standard t-test and skewness-adjusted t-test. The 
abnormal returns are size and book-to-market adjusted using method described in the data 
section.
The Table 6 shows the post-offering abnormal returns for the year following the offer month for 
public offerings20. These results are highly consistent with the long-term hypotheses presented in 
the hypotheses section that high-dispersion stocks underperform other stocks. All portfolios 
based on the dispersion level have negative returns. Both low-dispersion portfolios have only 
slightly negative returns (-0.28% and -1.74%), which are statistically insignificant. The upper 
middle group has abnormal return of -6.32% that is significant at 1% level (5% level if only 
standard t-test is used) and high-dispersion group has abnormal return of -17.13% (significant at 
0.1% level). This shows that stocks with high dispersion are able to use windows of 
opportunities. The post-offer abnormal returns for high-dispersion portfolio are significantly 
more negative at 0.1% significance level when compared to low-dispersion portfolios. The upper 
middle dispersion portfolio has also more negative returns when compared to low-dispersion 
portfolio at 10% significance level. This shows strong evidence supporting the hypotheses related 
to long-term performance following equity offerings. The underperformance observed in low- 
dispersion portfolios is so light, that the results suggest that market can estimate the magnitude of 
overvaluation of these stocks well and stock price adjustment at the announcement is almost 
perfect. The results also show that the long-term underperformance following the equity offerings 
is caused by high-dispersion stocks.
20 The new results based on tests using public offerings sample from which the before index addition offerings are 
excluded are show here from the portfolio with the lowest dispersion to the portfolio with the highest portfolio: - 
4.1%, -0.8%, -6.9% and -18.5%.
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Table 6: The test results of the post-offer long-run performance
The table shows the abnormal returns following the seasoned equity offerings. The public offer 
sample is divided into four portfolios based on the financial analysts' earnings per share forecast 
dispersion at the month preceding the offering. The rights offerings sample is divided into two 
portfolios based on dispersion level at the month preceding the offering. The abnormal returns are 
size- and book-to-market adjusted buy-and-hold returns. Those returns are calculated for the 12- 
month period starting at the month following the offering.
Public Offerings
Dispersion level at one month before the offering month
Less than 25% Less than 50% Less than 75% More than 75%
Abnormal returns -1.74% -0.28% -6.32% -17.13%
t-value -0.81 -0.14 -2.50 ** -4.60 ****
Skew-adj. T-value -0.87 -0.15 -2.69 *** -5.42 ****
Rights Offerings
Dispersion level at one month before the offering month
Less than 50% More than 50%
Abnormal returns -2.34% -4.83%
t-value -0.86 -1.23
Skew-adj. T-value -0.90 -1.25
Statistical significance is based on basic Student t-test and skewness-adjusted t-tests. **** denotes
that the value is significant at 0.1% level. *** denotes that the value is significant at the 1% level. ** 
denotes that the value is significant at the 5% level. * denotes that the value is significant at the 10% 
level,______________________________________________________________________________________
Long-term performance of rights offerings is also shown in the Table 6. Both the high and low- 
dispersion portfolios underperform, the high-dispersion one has lightly higher underperformance 
(-4.83% vs. -2.34%), but the underperformance of these portfolios is not statistically significant. 1 
tested also if these returns are different from each others and find that there is no statistically 
significant difference. These results are consistent with my hypotheses that the windows of 
opportunity -hypothesis valid among public offerings is not relevant for rights offerings. 
Therefore there should be normal performance after the offerings. High-dispersion portfolio’s 
negative abnormal returns show weak evidence that the absolute value of overvalued high- 
dispersion stocks’ underperformance exceeds the absolute value of undervalued high-dispersion 














































































































































































































The underperformance of high-dispersion stocks following public offerings can be seen from the 
Figure 7. The effect is especially strong in the case of stocks with highest quartile of dispersion. 
The two high-dispersion portfolios cause also the whole sample to have long-term 
underperformance. The whole sample has abnormal return of -6.4%, which is significant at 0.1% 
level based on both standard and skewness adjusted t-statistics. This is somewhat smaller than 
many earlier papers, for example Loughran and Ritter (1995), Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) 
and Jegadeesh (2000) have found. These papers studied longer period following the offering, but 
1 limit the duration of test period to one year to have maximum sample size. My results show that 
the dispersion effect can be seen easily with this choice of the duration. The stocks with less than 
median dispersion have abnormal returns equal to their reference indexes. The underperformance 
starts few months after the offering month, similar result as many earlier papers, for example 
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), Tripathy and Rao (1992) and Mikkelson and Partch, have 
found.
The rights offerings have less pronounced effects, which can also be seen from the Figure 8. 
Similar kind of few months’ positive performance is observable also in the case of rights 
offerings. After that underperformance of high-dispersion stocks start. The low-dispersion stocks 
start almost equal kind of underperformance few months later. The underperformance is weak 
compared to the high-dispersion stocks with public offering. The whole sample has abnormal 
return of -3.6%, which is statistically insignificant. These results are similar to other papers, for 








































































































































































































The test results based on the calendar-time approach point out that the test results based on the 
BHAR-method can be biased. At least these tests show that the underperformance effect is 
sensitive to the estimation method. The sample has monthly abnormal performance of -0.30%. 
However this figure is statistically insignificantly different from zero (p-value is only 0.104). 
This results is consistent with the another branch of papers studying the post-offer long-run 
performance, for example Brav et al. (1995) and Eckbo et al. (2000), which have found normal 
performance following the offer. It is potential that monthly abnormal performance figure is 
biased because of months with only few stocks in the portfolio, therefore I calculate also a new 
figure based on the months with over 50 stocks in the portfolio. This exclusion causes the number 
of sample months to decline with 13%. The new results: -0.36%, which is significant at 10% 
level, are therefore potentially less biased.
I divide the sample to three based on the dispersion level at the month before the offering month. 
The sorting is done using annual windows to make sure that dispersion limits stay valid. This 
method may limit the power of test because lower limits during low-dispersion years are 
associated with lower dispersion effect. The calendar-time test is made again for both extreme 
samples. The high dispersion portfolio consists of stocks with dispersion above the 60th 
percentile and stocks with dispersion level below the 40th percentile are included in the low- 
dispersion portfolio. The results are consistent with the long-term hypotheses presented in this 
thesis, that high-dispersion stocks underperform the other stocks. High-dispersion stocks have 
monthly underperformance of -0.55% (significant at 10% level). However the similar kind of bias 
caused by small number of stocks in certain months is affecting this figure. I decide to exclude 
months with less than 20 observations and new monthly abnormal return figure of -0.68% is 
calculated. This figure is statistically significant at the 5% level. The exclusion makes the sample 
size to decline by 12%. The low-dispersion group on the other hand has insignificant monthly 
abnormal return of -0.03%, and after the similar exclusion (14% of months excluded) the figure is 
-0.04%. Also this number is insignificantly different from zero.
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5.4. Chronological development
The Figure 9 shows that dispersion levels in different years vary and that those are high during 
the hot periods in the equity markets, so this graph is consistent with the hypothesis that 
dispersion level is positively associated with the issuance volume. The investors’ optimism 
should have highest impact on the high-dispersion stocks, and that can be seen from the graph by 
looking at the development of upper quartile, which shows the most dramatic changes. The post 
IT-bubble period has higher level of dispersion than the period before the IT-bubble. This could 
be related to institutional changes in the European equity issuance market between the periods.
I study also the post-offer long-run abnormal performance using annual samples to find if my 
hypothesis related to stronger dispersion effects during the hot periods is valid. The Table 7 
shows the abnormal returns following the issuance for the high (over median) and low dispersion 
(below median) stocks that have launched a public offering. I have used same portfolio limits for 
every year to make sure that stocks with low-dispersion cannot be included to high-dispersion 
portfolio during the years with low average dispersion level. This choice of limits makes the 
sample size small for years with low average dispersion. The abnormal returns are size- and 
book-to-market adjusted. Statistical significances are not reported because of small sample sizes.
The Table 7 shows that the poorer long-run performance of high-dispersion stocks is robust 
effect. These stocks have negative returns following the offering except on year 2003 and in 
addition these stocks underperform the low-dispersion stocks in every year except on year 2003. 
Year 2003 is exceptional, because that year is associated with the most positive post-offer 
performance during the sample period and dispersion seems to have no effect on the long-run 
performance. During this year the equity issuance markets started to recover and it is potential 
that the good offerings were delayed because of low issuance activity during the years following 
the ГГ-boom and therefore the recovery year can be associated with above-normal percentage of 
good offerings. The table shows that hot issuance years are associated with poorer long-run 
performance. IT-boom years are associated with very negative long-run performance. Later 
























































































Table 7: Annual long-term tests for public offerings
The table shows the abnormal returns following the public offerings using annual samples. These public 
offer samples are divided to two portfolios based on the financial analysts' earnings per share forecast 
dispersion at the month preceding the offering. The same portfolio limits based on the total sample are 
used every year. The abnormal returns are size- and book-to-market adjusted buy-and-hold returns. 
Those returns are calculated for the 12-month period starting at the month following the offering.
Dispersion is below 50% Dispersion is above 50%











The initial sample size for all opportunistic company tests except the announcement date test is 
992 public offerings. The smaller sample size compared to dispersion level tests is caused by 
extra requirement that stocks should have dispersion data for the year before the offering. The 
opportunistic company hypotheses are relevant only in the case of public offerings and therefore 
the rights offerings are excluded. The abnormal returns are size and book-to-market adjusted 
using method described in the data section. The reported significance is based on standard t-test 
and the skewness-adjusted t-test. The sample is divided to four portfolios based on the change in 
dispersion between the months -12 and -1 before the offering month. The limits used are same in 
every test.
5.5.1. Price run-up
Price run-up test sample is based on the initial sample. Stocks without return data or data for size 
or book-to-market adjustment for the year before the offering are excluded. After these extra 
requirements the sample size totals 982 public offerings. The sample period is from 12 months
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before the offering month to month before it. Both standard and skewness-adjusted t-statistics are 
presented.
Table 8: Price run-up test results for opportunistic companies
The table shows the abnormal returns preceding the public offerings. The sample is divided into four 
portfolios based on the change in dispersion during the year preceding the offering. The abnormal 
returns are size- and book-to-market adjusted buy-and-hold returns. Those returns are calculated for 
the 12-month period starting at one year before the offering.
Portfolios based on the change in dispersion
Biggest positive change is in the highest and biggest negative change is in the lowest percentile 
Less than 25% Less than 50% Less than 75% More than 75%
Abnormal returns 14.03% 4.89% 7.52% 12.34%
t-value 5.17**** 2.46** 3.91 **** 3.74****
Skew-adj. T-value 5.61**“ 2.22“ 3.90**** 4.13****
Statistical significance is based on basic Student t-test and skewness-adjusted t-tests. **** denotes 
that the value is significant at 0.1% level. *** denotes that the value is significant at the 1% level. ** 
denotes that the value is significant at the 5% level. * denotes that the value is significant at the 10% 
level. ____________________________________________________________ _ _______
Table 8 shows the price run-up based on the dispersion change portfolios. The low-change in 
dispersion group of stocks, the opportunistic companies, has highest abnormal return of 14.03%, 
which is significant at 0.1% level. The second highest return is found among the high-change 
portfolio, 12.34% (significant at 0.1% significance level). The middle change groups have lower 
returns: 4.89% and 7.52%, which are also significantly different from zero. These results are 
consistent with the hypothesis related to opportunistic companies, that these companies have high 
price run-up. This result shows that these companies are successful in their attempts to increase 
their market capitalization before the offering.
The opportunistic companies are divided quite levelly to dispersion level portfolios, however the 
stock with very high-dispersion have somewhat smaller representation in the portfolio; 15% of 
stocks in low-change portfolio are included in the high-dispersion portfolio. These figures show 
that this opportunistic company theory is independent effect as expected and also the smaller 
representation of high-dispersion companies is consistent with hypothesis that these companies 
are afraid of exposing their over-valuation to the market and therefore have fewer motives to be
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opportunistic. The higher price run-up in the high-change portfolios is related to high-dispersion 
stocks. 90% (60%) of stocks in this portfolio have higher than median (75th percentile) 
dispersion level one month before the offering month. The abnormal returns of low-change 
stocks are significantly different from the lower middle group of stocks at 1% level. This shows 
that the results are strongly consistent with opportunistic company theory.
The high- and low-change portfolios outperform the mid-change groups and the whole public 
offer sample (Figure 10). All portfolios show good stock price performance compared to their 
reference portfolios. The start of price run-up is later in the case of mid-change group stocks. The 
outperformance of high-change portfolio (dispersion change group 4) starts later than low-change 






























































































































































































































The sample size for the announcement date test is 1000 public offerings. The sample will include 
the stocks with return data for the days -5 to +10 and the dispersion level of the month before the 
offering month available. The issue date data is used again in this test. The portfolio limits are 
based on the initial opportunistic company sample. This choice guarantees that stock is always in 
the same portfolio. The abnormal returns are calculated using only market-adjustment, with 
market returns based on the returns of STOXX-600 index and assuming that the beta of every 
stock is equal to one.
Table 9: The announcement (issue date) effect of opportunistic companies
The table shows the abnormal returns around the issue date of the public offerings. The sample is 
divided into four portfolios based on the change in dispersion during the year preceding the offering. 
The abnormal returns are calculated using simple formula: return of the stock - return of the STOXX- 
600 index. Those returns are calculated for the day preceding the issue and for the issue date.
Portfolios based on the change in dispersion
Biggest positive change is in the highest and biggest negative change is in the lowest percentile 
Less than 25% Less than 50% Less than 75% More than 75%
Abnormal returns -1.07% -0.67% -0.60% -0.71%
t-value -3.63**" -2.50** -2.18** -2.24**
Statistical significance is based on basic Student t-test. **** denotes that the value is significant at 
0.1% level. *** denotes that the value is significant at the 1% level. ** denotes that the value is 
significant at the 5% level. * denotes that the value is significant at the 10% level.__________________
The Table 9 shows the cumulative abnormal returns of portfolios based on the dispersion change, 
which are in the range of -0.60% and -1.07%. All these portfolio returns are statistically 
significant at least at 5% significance level. The low-change portfolio has the most negative 
announcement effect of -1.07%. This is consistent with the hypothesis that opportunistic 
companies should have lower cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement, because 
markets are assumed to partially realize what these companies have been doing. The t-tests 
comparing the cumulative abnormal returns for low change to low middle change portfolio is 
however statistically insignificant (p-value is only 0.15) suggesting that hypothesis-consistent
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results consistent may be caused by pure chance. I expect that the statistical insignificance of 
opportunistic company effect is related to issue date data used in announcement date tests.
The abnormal returns of portfolios based on the change in dispersion can be seen from the Figure 
11. The returns of all portfolios behave quite similarly. There are positive abnormal returns 
before the issue date. Day before and the issue date are associated with negative abnormal 
returns. Finally there is a recovery after the issue date. Portfolio with higher change than median 
but lower than 75th percentile, outperforms others.
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Figure 11: Announcement (issue date) effect of opportunistic companies
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5.5.3. Post-offering long-run performance
This test uses the initial opportunistic company sample which includes 992 public offerings. The 
significance reported is based on standard t-test and the skewness-adjusted t-test.
Table 10: The post-offering long-run performance of opportunistic companies
The table shows the abnormal returns following the public offering. The sample is divided into four 
portfolios based on the change in dispersion during the year preceding the offering. The abnormal 
returns are size- and book-to-market adjusted buy-and-hold returns. Those returns are calculated for 
the 12-month period starting at the month following the offering.
Portfolios based on the change in dispersion
Biggest positive change is in the highest and biggest negative change is in the lowest percentile 
Less than 25% Less than 50% Less than 75% More than 75%
Abnormal returns -8.25% -3.21% 1.78% -9.75%
t-value -3.08*** -1.32 1.00 -3.24 ***
Skew-adj. T-value -3.43**** -1.40 0.97 -3.55****
Statistical significance is based on basic Student t-test and skewness-adjusted t-tests. **** denotes 
that the value is significant at 0.1% level. *** denotes that the value is significant at the 1% level. “ 
denotes that the value is significant at the 5% level. * denotes that the value is significant at the 10% 
level. ___________________________________________________ _______
The Table 10 shows that stocks with low-change in dispersion (opportunistic companies) have 
abnormal return of -8.25% and stocks with high-change have underperformance of 9.75%. Both 
returns are significantly different from zero at 0.1% level. The middle groups have insignificant 
excess returns (-3.21% and 1.78%). The low change portfolio has more negative returns than the 
lower middle group; however this result is only significant at 10% level. The results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that opportunistic companies have more negative long-term 
underperformance following public offerings than middle change groups. However the low 
significance shows that the evidence is not as strong as expected. It is potential that opportunistic 
companies cannot increase their market capitalization considerably before the offering and 
therefore the significance of long-term tests results could be low or that the investors realize the 
magnitude of over-valuation at the announcement quite well and therefore the overvaluation is 
almost totally eliminated at the announcement. The results of high-change group are related to the 
high-dispersion stocks’ dominance in that portfolio.
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The post-offer performance of dispersion change portfolios is shown in the Figure 12. The low- 
change portfolio starts underperforming right after the offering month. Other groups have the 
short-run abnormal return phenomena. After the short-run effect, the high-change portfolio starts 
having negative abnormal returns. The upper mid-group starts underperformance few months 
later; however it is clearly less severe. The lower mid-group has lightly positive abnormal 
returns.
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Figure 12: The post-offer long-run performance of opportunistic companies
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5.6. Choice between rights and public offerings
The sample used in this test will include equity offerings with dispersion level available at the 
month before the issuance month. First, two graphs point out that there are variation in the 
frequency of rights offerings between different years and among different dispersion classes. I 
test the effect of dispersion on the choice between the rights and public offerings using Mann- 
Whitney-Wilcoxon test. The descriptive statistics part of this thesis shows that rights offerings 
are bigger than public offerings and this is consistent with the hypothesis that investment bank 
actions are affected by the offering size. The dispersion limit is lower for big offerings and 
therefore rights offerings are associated with bigger offering sizes.
The Figure 13 presents some evidence that the frequency of rights offering is lower during the 
periods of high investors’ optimism. This result is consistent with hypothesis, that stocks with 
very high-dispersion can launch public offerings during these periods and therefore those stocks 
do not have to use rights offering method. During years 1995 to 1996 there are lots of right 
offerings, 42.5% of offerings were done via rights in 1995 and 31.3% in 1996. I assume that 
during that period legal and institutional requirements were favoring the rights offering method. 
1997 has actually quite low frequency of rights offerings (10.3%). During the IT-bubble the 
frequency of rights offering is low, in the range of 6.4% to 16.0%. After the bubble the 
percentage of rights offerings increases to the range of 18.2% to 19.5%.
Figure 14 shows that highest dispersion classes have higher incidence of rights offerings. In this 
quartile 21.9% of the offerings are done via rights. Other dispersion quartiles include almost 
equal amount of rights offerings, the percentage of those being in the range of 14.5% and 16.3%. 
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test tests if rights offering sample has higher dispersion ranks 
compared to dispersion ranks of public offers. First the dispersion levels are ranked one to 
maximum. Average values are assigned to values that are tied. The initial hypothesis of the test is 
that the ranks are divided evenly among the sub-groups. The test statistics has a value of 167,232. 
Based on the normal approximation this statistics has a z-value of 1.77. One sided p-value for this 
figure is 3.8%. The results are consistent with my hypothesis that frequency of rights offerings is 






































































































































Figure 14: Frequency of rights offerings in dispersion classes
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Hope (2003) finds that dispersion levels of European stocks excluding the companies from the 
UK are much higher than the dispersion levels of US stocks. I expect that this difference may 
partially explain the low frequency of rights offerings in the United States.
6. Conclusions
This thesis studies the effect of financial analysts’ earnings per share forecast dispersion on the 
seasoned equity offering process. Especially I focus on the price run-up, announcement effect, 
long-term underperformance and the choice of issuance method. The dispersion figure used in 
this test is the I/B/E/S summary forecast dispersion scaled using the book-per-share value for the 
stock measured at year before.
This thesis combines five branches of literature: dispersion, announcement effect of equity 
offerings, long-term underperformance, disclosure and the rights offer paradox. Barron et al. 
(1998, 1999) model dispersion as a proxy for two different variables: asymmetric information 
and uncertainty and I have divided the literature review related to dispersion based on this 
division. Dispersion literature has found that stocks with higher dispersion in analysts’ forecasts 
have significantly lower returns than otherwise similar stocks. For example Diether et al. (2002) 
propose that this negative association between the dispersion and returns is consistent with the 
Miller’s (1977) theory. Miller suggests that only optimists hold the stock, because high short-sale 
costs exclude the pessimists from the market. Stocks with highest divergence of opinion 
(asymmetric information) are expected to be overpriced. Estimation risk (uncertainty) can also 
cause the negative association between risk and returns.
Myers and Majlufs (1984) model suggests that announcement of new equity offering conveys 
unfavorable information to the market. Their model assumes that there are information 
asymmetries between the managers and market and managers are expected to act in the best 
interest of current shareholders. The empirical evidence is supporting their model. For example 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) find that seasoned equity offerings are associated with abnormal 
return of approximately -3%. Similar results are documented by numerous papers, for example
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Masulis and Korwar (1986) and Asquith and Mullins (1986). Rights offerings and non-US public 
offering are found to be associated with smaller abnormal returns at the announcement (for 
example Eckbo and Masulis (1992), Gajevsky and Ginlinger (2002) and Cooney et al. (1997)).
Ritter (1991) finds that IPOs underperform significantly following the offer. He suggests that his 
results are supporting the hypothesis that companies can take advantage of windows of 
opportunities. Loughran and Ritter (1995) study also the SEOs and find that those underperform 
also during three to five years following the offer. Similar results are also posted by for example 
Spiess and Afleck-Graves (1995) and Jegadeesh (2000). Burch et al. (2004) find that rights 
offerings do not have long-term abnormal underperformance. The results of long-term event 
studies are criticized because of numerous statistical problems21.
Theoretical disclosure literature argues that companies can decrease the information asymmetry 
by voluntary disclosure22 23. Better disclosure quality is found to be associated with decreases in 
dispersion by for example Lang and Lundholm (1986), Healy et al. (1995) and Barron et al. 
(1999). In addition different kind of informative releases by companies are found to have effect 
on the dispersion22. Higher disclosure frequency is found to be associated with equity issuance24. 
Lang and Lundholm (2000) also suggest that this higher frequency has effect on the 
announcement effect and long-term underperformance.
Eckbo and Masulis (1992) model tries to explain firm’s choice of equity flotation method. The 
preference for firm commitments in the United States is a puzzle especially when rights offers 
have substantially lower flotation costs. Their model explains the puzzle by adding a new cost 
called adverse selection cost.
My sample includes all public and rights offering launched between 1995 and 2004 by stocks that 
have been included in the Dow Jones STOXX-600 index between January 1 1995 and December 
31 2005. The dispersion data is from I/B/E/S Summary history file. Other data is collected using
21 For example Barber and Lyon (1997), Kothari and Warner (1997) Barber et al. (1999), Fama (1998) and Mitchell 
and Stafford (2000).
22 For example Barry and Brown (1984, 1985), Merton (1987) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1994)
23 For example Clement et al. (2003) and Bowen et al. (2002)
24 For example Healy et al. (1999) Frankel et al. (1995) and Marquardt and Wiedman (1998)
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Thomson, Datastream and Worldscope. The initial sample size is 1513. I estimate the long-run 
abnormal performance using both the BHAR and calendar-time method. For BHAR both 
standard and skewness adjusted t-statistics are shown. My main test compares the abnormal 
performance between different group of stocks and by using this method many statistical 
problems can be mitigated.
The theory presented in this thesis is based on Miller (1977). High-short sale costs exclude 
pessimists from the market and stock price is based on only the high valuation by optimist 
investors. Stocks with high divergence of opinion become overvalued. Uncertainty complicates 
the situation and makes part of the high-dispersion stocks undervalued. Managers are assumed to 
act similarly to Myers and Majlufs (1984) model; they act in the best interest of current 
shareholders and try to issue overvalued equity. The theory assumes that investment banks are 
not willing to underwrite the public offerings launched by companies with very high dispersion, 
because they are afraid of losing their reputation. The only option for these companies to issue 
equity immediately is to choose rights offerings method.
My price run-up hypothesis assumes that the overvalued high-dispersion stocks are associated 
with higher price run-up than other public offerings, because these stocks experience 
considerable increases in dispersion before the offering. The test results show that these stocks 
have higher price run-up, but the results is not significant (p-value is only 0.17). All dispersion 
portfolios based on the public offering sample have price run-up, which is consistent with my 
theory.
The signal related to equity issuance announcement causes bigger adjustment to stock price in the 
case of high-dispersion stocks, because optimists become more disappointed than pessimist. The 
test results are not consistent with the hypothesis, but this could be related to the use of issue date 
data instead of announcement date data. All dispersion portfolios have negative abnormal returns 
around the announcement and that result is consistent with my theory.
The announcement does not eliminate the overpricing totally and therefore some companies can 
take advantage of their over-valuation. The more overvalued stocks are expected to have poorer
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long-run performance. Test results are strongly consistent with this hypothesis. The abnormal 
returns of high-dispersion portfolio are significantly more negative than the returns of low- 
dispersion portfolios.
In addition I present a theory on opportunistic companies that try to increase their market 
capitalization by active disclosure policy and earnings management. If these companies are 
successful in their attempts, these companies should have higher price run-up, and poorer 
announcement and long-run performance than other companies except the high-dispersion stocks. 
The price run-up results are consistent with the theory, the announcement effect of opportunistic 
companies is poorer than other companies, but here results are not statistically significant (p- 
value is only 0.15). The long-run post-offer performance is consistent with the theory.
1 also argue that companies with very high-dispersion levels should have increased likelihood of 
rights offerings and decreased likelihood of public offerings. The test results are consistent with 
the theory.
The effect of dispersion on the announcement effect of seasoned equity offerings is still unclear 
and extra tests with new data can yield interesting results. Similar tests should also be run for the 
sample including at least US stocks and smaller stocks to make sure that the effect of dispersion 
on SEOs is not valid only in my sample. The rights vs. public offerings choice could be tested 
using regression with other potentially significant variables included. In addition it would be 
interesting to see if the dispersion can explain the differences in rights offering frequency 
between the United States and Europe. Studying the effect of dispersion on the volume effects of 
SEO announcement could also have interesting results. In addition, dispersion can have 
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